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Abstract: David Schizer, Frictions as a Constraint on Tax Planning
In recent years, the government has enacted a series of narrow tax reforms targeting
specific planning strategies. Sometimes these reforms stop the targeted planning, but sometimes
they merely prompt a new, more wasteful variation. The difference often lies in so-called
frictions, which are constraints on tax planning other than the tax law, such as fees, accounting or
regulatory treatment, credit risk, and the like. While frictions are important, reformers often lack
key information, and legal academics should help provide it. This Article offers general
observations about frictions that deter end runs. Most promising are strong “discontinuous”
frictions that impose significant costs when taxpayers depart, even in subtle ways, from the
transaction covered by the reform. Costs of relying on frictions are also considered, including
information costs and distributional effects. Two case studies also are offered involving taxmotivated use of derivative financial securities. These reforms use essentially the same statutory
language, but taxpayers have responded differently – and frictions explain this difference. The
first reform, the “constructive sale” rule of Section 1259, targets use of derivatives in effect to sell
an appreciated asset without paying tax. The second, the “constructive ownership” rule of
Section 1260, targets use of derivatives in effect to invest in a hedge fund (or other pass-through
entity) without the usual adverse tax consequences (i.e., less deferral and a higher tax rate).
Theoretically, taxpayers can avoid either rule through relatively modest changes in the derivative’s
economic return. This strategy is commonly used to avoid Section 1259, a reality that was
understood by government and taxpayers alike when the measure was enacted. In contrast, this
strategy is not commonly used to avoid Section 1260. The difference, which was not well
understood by Section 1260’s drafters, is that securities dealers cannot supply the derivative that
theoretically avoids the rule.

For years, the tax system has wrestled with the problem of wasteful tax planning. Because
the tax law often treats similar transactions differently, restructuring can significantly reduce the
tax burden. Aggressive planning is pervasive not only in so-called tax shelters, which are not the
focus of this Article, but also in real business deals such as sale of an asset or financing of a
venture. Ambitious reforms, such as mark to market accounting or a consumption tax, could
eliminate many discontinuities in the tax law and associated planning opportunities. But these
steps are politically unattainable, at least for now.1 Instead, in recent years the government has

1

Under mark-to-market accounting, investment returns are taxed annually based on changes in the asset’s fair
market value, regardless of whether the property has been sold. See, e.g., David Shakow, Taxation Without
Realization: A Proposal for Accrual Taxation, 134 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1111 (1986) (proposing broader use of mark-tomarket taxation). Under a consumption tax, investment returns generally would not be taxed. See, e.g., William
D. Andrews, A Consumption-Type or Cash Flow Personal Income Tax, 87 Harv. L. Rev. 1113 (1974). Political
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used a less satisfying strategy: narrow reforms that target specific planning strategies. In these
transactional responses, as they are called here, the tax treatment of a particular transaction is
modified to restore the customary result.2
This Article emphasizes that, in crafting transactional responses, reformers must consider
constraints on tax planning other than the tax law. Even if a tax planning strategy is legally
permissible, taxpayers may still abandon it as practically unworkable. Transaction costs may be
too high, financial accounting or regulatory treatment may be unappealing, and the like.
Borrowing from the economics literature, and specifically from Professors Scholes and Wolfson,
this Article uses the term “frictions” to describe constraints on tax planning other than the tax
law.3 An understanding of these nonlegal constraints reveals which tax planning merits an
immediate legal response – and thus a commitment of administrative resources and political
capital – and which planning is theoretical only. If a legal response is needed, frictions inform
how broad the legal rule must be to actually stop the planning, instead of merely spawning a new
variation.
The stakes are high, whether one cares about equity or efficiency. For instance, a reform

and other obstacles to either reform are thoroughly explored elsewhere. See generally, e.g., Uneasy Compromise:
Problems of a Hybrid Income-Consumption Tax (Henry Aaron et al. eds. 1988).
2

For instance, since sales of appreciated assets trigger capital gains tax, a recent transactional response discussed
in this Article, Section 1259, imposed tax on previously untaxed “hedging” transactions that closely resemble
sales. In addition to the other case study discussed in this Article, the constructive ownership rule of Section 1260,
other recent transactional responses include limits on the so-called “Morris trust” spin-off, see Section 355(e), the
legislative response to the Seagrams transaction, Section 1059, holding period rules for claiming foreign tax
credits, see Section 901(k), denial of interest deductions on debt that converts mandatorily into equity, see Section
163l, the Treasury’s unsuccessful proposal to deny interest deductions for “MIPS” and other instruments treated as
equity for accounting purposes, and the unsuccessful proposal to deny interest deductions on certain convertible
OID instruments such as LYONS.
3

See Myron Scholes & Mark A. Wolfson, Taxes and Business Strategy 7 (1992) (“By frictions we mean transaction
costs incurred in the marketplace that make implementation of certain tax-planning strategies costly.”). Professor
Scholes is a Nobel-prize winning economist, and Professor Wolfson is a distinguished academic accountant.
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will not raise revenue or increase the tax burden on wealthy taxpayers if they can substitute other
strategies not covered by the reform, a process here called “avoidance.” Likewise, if a reform
merely makes planning more expensive, but fails to stop anyone, social waste increases. In some
cases, then, a narrow reform will be counterproductive. To avoid this outcome, the reform must
cover close substitutes, as Professors Shaviro and Weisbach have emphasized.4

Yet when does

one transaction substitute for another? For sophisticated commercial transactions, the answer lies
not so much in murky notions of consumer taste, but in accounting conventions, securities laws,
and other frictions that legal academics are well positioned to explore. Even though these issues
do not bear directly on a taxpayer’s ability to pay – a core issue in tax policy – they can be vital to
the success or failure of incremental reforms.
Many government reformers (and tax planners) appreciate the significance of frictions.
Yet reformers often lack key information. How hard will it be to avoid a particular reform? What
frictions will stand in the way, if any, and will taxpayers be deterred? Empirical work is needed,
especially because frictions are constantly changing. Many have become weaker due to
globalization, deregulation, and financial engineering. Indeed, it is well understood that these
developments pose new challenges to the tax system. To meet these challenges, we need to know
4

See Daniel N. Shaviro, An Efficiency Analysis of Realization and Recognition Rules Under the Federal Income
Tax, 48 Tax L. Rev. 1, 31 (1992) (“It is a standard optimal tax insight that we want to tax high-rent, relatively
inelastic events."); David A. Weisbach, Line Drawing, Doctrine, and Efficiency in the Tax Law, 84 Cornell L.
Rev. 1627 (1999) (emphasizing relevance of cross-elasticity to line-drawing). This Article extends efforts of
Professors Shaviro and Weisbach to apply optimal tax principles to incremental tax reform. Legal distinctions
would be based on the cross elasticity of taxpayer demand for various substitutes. Yet Professors Shaviro and
Weisbach do not explore the specifics of what cross-elasticity means in sophisticated commercial transactions.
Professor Schlunk has recently questioned their recommendation by asserting that elasticity is not a meaningful
concept in such transactions. He argues that, through financial engineering, taxpayers can package cash flows in
different ways that are all equally appealing, but are taxed differently. See Herwig J. Schlunk, Little Boxes: Can
Optimal Commodity Tax Methodology Save the Debt-Equity Distinction? (draft of Nov. 5, 2000). While Professor
Schlunk’s argument may apply in the long-run, depending upon the evolution of financial engineering and
deregulation, his claim often does not hold under current conditions. A main point of this Article is that, in some
commercial transactions, elasticity is a meaningful concept because of frictions. An important challenge for
reformers is to understand when frictions are sufficiently meaningful to constrain planning, and when they are not.
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which frictions are still significant.5 While accountants on business school faculties have produced
empirical work on frictions, legal academics largely have not. Their absence is notable because
legal regimes other than the tax law are an important source of frictions.6
Part I offers general observations about frictions that deter end runs.7 Most promising are
strong “discontinuous” frictions. These impose significant costs when taxpayers depart, even in
subtle ways, from the transaction covered by the reform. When supported by these frictions, even
a narrow reform can be effective, a term used here to describe success in stopping the targeted
planning. Balanced against this advantage are costs of relying on frictions, including the need to
learn esoteric institutional details, the instability of frictions over time, and effects on behavior
other than tax planning.

5

For example, financial innovation is known to create tax planning opportunities. In making this important point,
commentators typically assume away transaction costs and other frictions. See, e.g., Alvin C. Warren, Jr.,
Financial Contract Innovation and Income Tax Policy, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 460, 467 (1993) (“To simplify the
exposition, we have made some assumptions that the reader may regard as unrealistic. For example, we have
ignored transaction costs and credit risks.”); David F. Bradford, Fixing Realization Accounting: Symmetry,
Consistency and Correctness in the Taxation of Financial Instruments, 50 Tax L. Rev. 731, 732 (1995) (“I focus on
a world with no transactions costs.”). This assumption is helpful in dramatizing long-term threats to the system.
But the assumption is less helpful in crafting narrow transactional reforms (which, for now, are the only ones that
are politically viable). These measures work best when reinforced by frictions, and so we need to know where the
frictions are.
6

For a survey of the accounting literature, see Douglas A Shackelford & Terry Shevlin, Empirical Tax Research in
Accounting, J. Accounting & Econ. (forthcoming 2000). The role of securities and commodities laws, incomplete
markets, credit risk, and other frictions remains largely unexplored. The legal academy generally has not joined in
this inquiry, with the brief exception of Mark Gergen, Apocalypse Not?, 50 Tax L. Rev. (1995). As “transaction
cost engineers,” lawyers have a comparative advantage in probing legal regimes and transaction costs. See Ronald
J. Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset Pricing, 94 Yale L. J. 239, 255 (1984)
(arguing that “lawyers function as transaction cost engineers”).
7

In highlighting frictions as a constraint on tax planning, this Article parts company with Mark Gergen and Paula
Schmitz, who emphasize tax uncertainty. See Mark P. Gergen and Paula Schmitz, The Influence of Tax Law on
Securities Innovation in the United States, 1981-1997, 52 Tax L. Rev. 119 (1997). In my experience, uncertainty
about tax treatment will not necessarily keep a tax-advantaged deal from catching on. As Professor Bankman has
emphasized, corporate taxpayers are quite tolerant of tax risk because auditing of sophisticated transactions is
cursory. See Joseph Bankman, The New Market in Corporate Tax Shelters, 83 Tax Notes 1775 (1999). Likewise,
several structures have thrived notwithstanding uncertain tax treatment. See, e.g., David Schizer, Debt
Exchangeable for Common Stock: Electivity and the Tax treatment of Issuers and Holders, Derivatives Report,
March 2000, at 10 (noting that the tax treatment of DECS is uncertain, but transaction is quite common).
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Parts II and III consider two recent statutory provisions that highlight the significance of
frictions. Both target a tax-motivated use of derivative financial securities.8 These reforms use
the same statutory language, but taxpayers have responded differently – and frictions explain this
difference. The first reform, the “constructive sale” rule of Section 1259, targets use of
derivatives in effect to sell an appreciated asset without paying tax. The second, the “constructive
ownership” rule of Section 1260, targets use of derivatives in effect to invest in a hedge fund9 (or
other pass-through entity) without the usual adverse tax consequences (i.e., less deferral and a
higher tax rate). Theoretically, taxpayers can avoid either rule through relatively modest changes
in the derivative’s economic return. As discussed in Part II, this strategy is commonly used to
avoid Section 1259, a reality that was understood by government and taxpayers alike when the
measure was enacted. In contrast, as discussed in Part III, this strategy is not commonly used to
avoid Section 1260. The difference, which was not well understood by Section 1260’s drafters, is
that securities dealers cannot supply the derivative that theoretically avoids the rule. This is not to
say that Section 1260 is never avoided. Instead of derivatives, insurance contracts and
investments in offshore insurance firms have attracted taxpayer interest, although these strategies
are impeded by other frictions and tax rules, and probably could be blocked entirely by surgical
responses from the Treasury Department. In any event, the essential point of these case studies is
that even the same statutory language can induce different taxpayer responses, depending upon
the frictions involved. Thus, frictions deserve careful attention from reformers and scholars.

8

A derivative financial security is a contract whose value derives from some financial fact. For instance, an option
to buy stock is a derivative. See generally Global Derivatives Study Group, Derivatives: Practices and Principles
28 (1993) (“In the most general terms, a derivatives transaction is a bilateral contract or payments exchange
agreement whose value derives, as its name implies, from the value of an underlying asset or underlying reference
rate or index.”).
9

Hedge funds are investment vehicles for wealthy individuals and institutions. Because these funds are not
registered under the Investment Company Act of 1940, and thus need not comply with regulatory and disclosure
requirements applicable to mutual funds, these ventures are available only to investors meeting minimum wealth
requirements. Managers generally are compensated by a share of profits above a minimum return (e.g., 20% of all
returns above 15%) instead of by a fixed share of assets under management, which is the norm for mutual funds.
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BACKSTOPPING NARROW RULES WITH FRICTIONS

A limit on tax planning is seldom appealing if it merely prompts taxpayers to plan in a
different, more wasteful way, as Section A observes. Although this outcome is less likely if the
reform is broad in scope, narrow measures sometimes will be used for substantive and political
reasons, as discussed in Section B. A narrow measure’s appeal depends, to a considerable
degree, on whether end runs will be blocked by frictions. Section C offers general observations
about which frictions will be most effective, and also lists examples. Yet reliance on frictions is
not cost-free. Section D identifies common pitfalls.
A. Policy Goals in Targeting Tax Planning
Reasons to curtail tax planning are familiar. Obviously, more revenue is collected. In
addition, social waste is reduced as taxpayers refrain from tax-motivated behavior.10 Since
wealthy and well-advised taxpayers have an edge in planning, limiting this advantage can lead to a
fairer distribution of tax burdens.11 If other taxpayers believe the system is stacked against them,
they may be less likely to comply voluntarily, and tax collection would become more expensive.12
Yet not every attack on tax planning is advisable. Planning functions as a tax reduction,
and in some cases taxes should be reduced.13 It is usually better, though, to reduce the rate or
even repeal the undesirable tax, thereby eliminating the need for wasteful taxpayer self- help.14
Since explicit tax reductions are relatively easy to implement, this Article focuses instead on
challenges in maintaining or increasing the tax burden. In other words, the targeted planning is
10

See Harvey S. Rosen, Public Finance 284 (5th ed.1999) (noting that a tax is efficient if it raises revenue with a
minimum of behavioral distortions and other sources of dead weight loss).
11

This conclusion assumes the benefits of planning are not fully capitalized into pretax prices, and also that other
features of the tax code, such as the rate structure, have not already been adjusted to account for the planning.
12

See Joel Slemrod, Trust in Public Finance (working paper on file with author).

13

See Weisbach, supra note 4, at 1679 (listing as one of the “most important factors [in deciding where to draw a
line in the tax law is]. . . whether transactions are taxed appropriately when considered by themselves”).
14

The “check the box” rules are an example of this approach. See Treas. Reg. 1.7701-4.
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assumed to yield an inappropriately low tax.
Even when such planning is targeted, it is well understood that reforms can be costly.
They consume administrative resources, raise compliance costs, and may also undermine “good”
transactions that are not tax-motivated.15 Most importantly for our purposes, half-hearted efforts
may merely add to the cost of planning without stopping anyone, thereby increasing social waste
without collecting more revenue.16 Indeed, even if some planning is stopped, total planning waste
could still increase if those who continue to plan face higher costs. The added waste from their
continuing efforts sometimes will outweigh the savings from those who stop.17 If the reform
cannot be made more effective (e.g., due to political or administrability constraints), it may be
better to do nothing, or even to make the targeted planning easier. Although revenue would not
be raised, at least planning waste would be reduced.
Nevertheless, even relatively ineffective efforts to curtail planning sometimes yield
symbolic benefits. By responding to highly-publicized planning, the government signals to
average taxpayers that everyone, including wealthy taxpayers, must pay tax. Average taxpayers
thus may be encouraged to comply voluntarily with other tax rules (e.g., to pay tax on untraceable
cash receipts). Ironically, this benefit can arise even if the measure is toothless – as long as
average taxpayers lack the sophistication to see that it is toothless. For sophisticated transactions,
this assumption is plausible in the short run, but less so in the long run.
The appeal of any effort to curtail planning depends upon the particular balance of all
15

See David Weisbach, An Economic Analysis of Tax Avoidance Doctrines (working paper) (describing tradeoffs
in anti-avoidance measures, including concerns about “error,” i.e., application to transactions that are not tax
motivated). The meaning of “good’ depends on the context and normative value being pursued. For instance, we
may wish to impose a tax increase or other penalty only when taxpayer demand for the transaction is inelastic or
when the transaction is motivated primarily by tax considerations. Likewise, we may deny a tax preference if the
transaction does not generate positive externalities, or if the taxpayer has too high an income.
16

This point has recently been emphasized in Daniel N. Shaviro, Economic Substance, Corporate Tax Shelters,
and the Compaq Case, 88 Tax Notes 221 (2000).
17

Professor Kaplow has emphasized this tradeoff between welfare gains from deterring marginal taxpayers, on one
hand, and welfare costs from inducing more waste by infra-marginal taxpayers. See Louis Kaplow, Optimal
Taxation With Costly Enforcement and Evasion, 43 J. Public Econ. 221 (1990).
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these benefits and costs.18 This Article focuses on a key component of this inquiry: whether a
narrow reform will actually stop the targeted planning. In other words, when will a measure offer
benefits beyond symbolism?
B. Impediments to Use of Broad Legal Responses
A broad response is more likely to stop the targeted planning, but often is not feasible.
Indeed, fundamental tax reform, such as universal mark-to-market accounting, could eliminate
planning by treating all equivalent transactions consistently and accurately. But obstacles to this
step are well known.19 In a more modest strategy, broad anti-abuse rules would target particular
planning strategies, covering not only the current version, but every imaginable mutation. Yet to
avoid burdening “good” transactions, we sometimes will need detailed exceptions or subtle tests
that are expensive to draft and enforce.20

These concerns should not be overstated. The tax bar

often will help flag overbroad applications, and also may ”save” good transactions through
creative interpretations.21 Even so, such self-help is expensive.22 Nor does it work in all cases.
18

See generally Joel Slemrod & Shlomo Yitzhaki, The Costs of Taxation and the Marginal Efficiency Cost of
Funds, 43 IMF Staff Papers 172 (Mar. 1996) (noting that tax reforms are efficient in adding the least social waste
per dollar of additional revenue and listing five potential sources of social waste: the costs of substitution effects,
avoidance, compliance, administration, and evasion).
19

See Reed Shuldiner, A General Approach to the Taxation of Financial Instruments, 71 Tex. L. Rev. 243, 245
(1992) (“Most, if not all of these problems [with taxing financial instruments] could be solved by abandoning our
current realization system and adopting mark-to-market accounting for financial instruments. While there has
been some movement in this direction, it is unlikely that Congress (or the financial community) will accept
wholesale use of mark-to-market accounting.”); see also David M. Schizer, Sticks and Snakes: Derivatives and
Curtailing Aggressive Tax Planning, 73 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1339, 1343 n. 10 (2000) (citing various commentators who
have concluded that comprehensive mark-to-market taxation is unlikely to be enacted soon).
20

See Louis Kaplow, Rules versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 Duke L.J. 557 (1992) (noting tradeoff
between cost of formulating more detailed rules and waste from overbroad applications or from amending the rule
later).
21

For example, the contingent debt rules of Treas. Reg. 1.1275-4, which offer unfavorable treatment to holders,
apply to any debt not eligible for an enumerated exception. Under a literal reading, the regulations could apply to
a fixed-rate bond of a foreign issuer, merely because the coupon would be increased if a foreign jurisdiction were to
begin withholding tax on interest. Although no exception quite fits these bonds, opinions are consistently given
that the contingent debt rules do not apply. See NYSBA Urges IRS to Issue Revenue Ruling on Contingent
Payment Debt Regs, 97 TNT 147-82 (July 31, 1997) (seeking ruling that contingent debt rules are not triggered by
gross-ups). I thank Robin Shifrin for this example. Likewise, when legislative history directs the Treasury to
remedy overbreadth through regulations, advisors often do not wait for regulations before issuing favorable
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Aggressive taxpayers have an advantage, and the I.R.S. has discretion that may not be used
responsibly.23
On the merits, then, broad rules are not appropriate in all cases. Even when a broad
response is desirable – and, in my view, it often is – politics can stand in the way. Responses to
planning draw political strength in providing “revenue raisers” to fund other initiatives.24 In
addition, media coverage of the targeted abuse can ensure some response. Yet affected taxpayers
often can keep the measure narrow. They rely heavily on rhetoric about overbreadth. In
response, overworked and inexperienced government drafters sometimes narrow the measure
more than they realize by agreeing to subtle changes in language or legislative history. Or
reformers may realize what is being given up, but see no other way to get the measure enacted.
Either way, the general public lacks the sophistication to judge whether a reform targeting
complex commercial transactions will be effective. As a result, a narrow measure can yield
symbolic benefits. At the same time, self-interested legislators can use narrow measures to
placate affected interest groups (by leaving alternatives open), while claiming exaggerated credit
with the general public (who do not yet know that planning will continue).25
opinions. For instance, Section 355(d) was meant to keep corporations from attaining tax-free treatment for
certain spinoffs that would otherwise be taxable sales. As Professor Ginsburg has observed, “Because Code §355(d)
is broadly drafted, it facially encompasses a variety of Code §355 distributions that do not appear to raise the
concerns that prompted Congress to enact Code §355(d).” Martin D. Ginsburg & Jack S. Levin, 1 Mergers,
Acquisitions, and Buyouts 10-79 (Nov. 2000 ed.). To solve this problem, the legislative history authorized
regulations excluding from the provision “transactions that do not violate the purposes of this provision,” including
distributions that do not increase ownership in distributing or controlled or provide a basis step-up. See 1990
Conference Report, reprinted in CCH Standard Federal Tax Reporter, at 16,460. Yet tax advisors did not wait nine
years for regulations before applying these principles. I thank Michael Schler for this example. For another, see
the discussion of unbalanced straddles in David M. Schizer, Executives and Hedging: The Fragile Legal
Foundation of Incentive Compatibility, 100 Colum. L. Rev 479-80 (2000).
22

Edward Kleinbard has described the costliness and time-intensiveness of giving tax advice. See Edward D.
Kleinbard, Equity Derivatives Products: Financial Innovation’s Newest Challenge to the Tax System, 69 Tex. L.
Rev. 1319 (1991).
23

See Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules, 93 Yale L. J. 65, 75 (1983) (imprecise rules
allow discretion to the administrator, the desirability of which depends upon the trustworthiness of this agent).
24

See Elizabeth Garrett, Harnessing Politics: The Dynamics of Offset Requirements in the Tax Legislative Process,
65 U. Chi. L. Rev. 501 (1998).
25

In some cases, of course, keeping the reform narrow will not rescue planning opportunities – that is, where
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C. In Search of Effective Frictions
In sum, broad legal responses sometimes are not viable for substantive and political
reasons. Yet narrow rules can still be effective, especially in reinforcing other anti-abuse
measures that already are on the books. Even if a narrow rule omits a particular avoidance
strategy, taxpayers will not use this “out” if key business and legal objectives cannot be satisfied.
How can reformers anticipate whether frictions will prevent end runs?26 Taxpayer preferences
about the friction must be inelastic,27 but this merely restates the inquiry. Likewise, the cost
imposed by the friction must outweigh the tax benefit, but this generalization gives no specific
guidance.
1. General Guidance
Four factors make the inquiry more concrete. First, how large is the tax benefit?
Obviously, the larger it is, the more persuasive the friction must be. Is the tax benefit deferral or
forgiveness? What tax rate applies? Is it the rate for capital gain or ordinary income? Are the
relevant taxpayers individuals or corporations? How much income is at stake? Has this income

frictions block these opportunities, as discussed below. Once a narrow rule will block any abusive transaction that
would be viable, it might not be more difficult politically to pass a broader rule. Affected interest groups would not
object to the broader version if, from their perspective, it has exactly the same effect as a narrow rule – that is, if
there is no abusive transaction to save by keeping the rule narrow. However, there may be nonabusive transactions
to save. Thus the political analysis merges with the substantive analysis of overbreadth described above (i.e., in
which narrow rules have the virtue of infringing less on “good” transactions).
26

Wasteful planning can arise not only when taxpayers avoid a reform, but also when they deliberately qualify. As
I have addressed this issue elsewhere, I do not focus on it here. See generally Schizer, supra note 19. A (partial)
response is to use so-called one-way rules that, in most cases, serve only to increase the tax burden (e.g., in
accelerating gains but not losses) and are less likely to offer taxpayers a result they could not otherwise attain. The
case studies in this Article, Sections 1259 and 1260, are one-way rules. They accelerate gains only, without
affecting losses. As a result, they are less likely to offer new tax reduction strategies. For taxpayers who want to
accelerate gain, there are cheaper ways than triggering these rules.
27

See Shaviro, supra note 4 (emphasizing importance of elasticity); Weisbach, supra note 4 (same).

Schizer, Frictions as a Constraint on Tax Planning

Page 11

already been earned economically (e.g., built-in gain), or does the tax strategy apply only to
(potentially speculative) future gains?
Second, how “strong” is the friction? In other words, how much do taxpayers care about
it? For instance, assume that a reform shuts down a planning strategy with one exception. The
tax benefit is still available to taxpayers who “materially participate” in the venture that generates
the tax benefit.28 To judge the strength of this friction, we must know how much time taxpayers
must devote, and how different the venture is from their usual activities. Mink farmers will not
mind raising minks in order to claim generous depreciation deductions, but dentists are likely to
feel differently, especially if they would have to spend a day a week to do so (instead of, say, a
week a year in a sunny locale).
In addition to the strength of the friction, we must understand how difficult it is for the
taxpayer to attain (or avoid) the benefits (or costs) of the friction while still achieving the tax
objective.29 Since many frictions are quite important to taxpayers, this third question is often
crucial. For instance, taxpayers are concerned about the level of economic risk required to attain
a tax benefit. Yet if the government specifies a minimum amount, many will bear just a modicum
more. On the other hand, what if a regulatory regime prevents taxpayers from taking this extra
risk? A much greater sacrifice is required to get the tax benefit, and many more will be deterred.
To put the point more generally, there are two kinds of frictions. With a “discontinuous”
friction, such as the regulatory regime in our example, a minor change in the transaction can have
a dramatic effect on taxpayer utility.30 Such a friction can help a narrow reform to be effective: If
28

See Section 469 (disallowing losses from passive activities, which are defined as activities in which the taxpayer
does not “materially participate”).
29

Cf. Shaviro, supra note 4, at 32 (in determining elasticity, we must ask ‘how strongly is the taxpayer constrained
by the friction” and “what alternative routes with different tax consequences could the taxpayer use”).
30

In an insightful article, Professor Strnad has used the concept of continuity to describe tax rules (i.e., to indicate
whether minor changes in the transaction trigger major changes in tax treatment). See Jeff Strnad, Taxing New
Financial Products: A Conceptual Framework, 46 Stan. L. Rev. 569, 584 (1994). The concept is extended here to
frictions. The difference between discontinuous and continuous frictions also resembles Professor Cooter’s
distinction between sanctions and prices, in that a sanction causes a dramatic change in utility, whereas a price
does not. See Robert Cooter, Prices and Sanctions, 84 Colum. L. Rev. 1523 (1984). Yet Professor Cooter’s
terminology works better for regulatory regimes, in that some authority is imposing the sanction. Discontinuous
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the reform fails to block a substitute, the friction will block it (assuming, of course, that the
friction is strong enough).31 In contrast, with a “continuous” friction, such as risk for the average
taxpayer, minor changes in the transaction (e.g., a modicum of extra risk) have a proportionally
modest effect on taxpayer welfare. Such frictions are less likely to prevent avoidance of a narrow
rule. Instead, the rule must be broader so the cumulative effect of the continuous friction (e.g.,
the need to take a lot more risk) is an adequate deterrent. To change the metaphor, in the first
case the taxpayer is standing on the edge of a cliff and cannot move over (i.e., to avoid tax)
without falling off. In the other case, the taxpayer is on a slope and so a step to one side,
although perhaps unwelcome, is likely to be feasible.32
Finally, reformers must consider the “position” of the friction – that is, who is affected by
it. Frictions that affect taxpayers themselves obviously are relevant, but so are frictions affecting
advisors or the likely counterparty.33 For instance, if the taxpayer must have a legal opinion (e.g.,
to avoid penalties), frictions that discourage counsel from rendering the opinion impede
planning.34 Likewise, if the taxpayer needs a securities dealer for a planning strategy, frictions
that prevent the dealer from supplying the requisite security can stop planning as effectively as
frictions that govern the taxpayer directly.35 Reformers should learn about frictions that affect
frictions arise not only from regulatory regimes, but also from imperfect markets or technological limitations.
31

If the friction is not strong enough, even a discontinuous friction will not stop the planning. Assume, for
instance, that a narrow reform applies to every version of a planning strategy but one, and the omitted one violates
a regulatory regime (but others do not). This friction is discontinuous in that the regulatory penalty applies to this
substitute alone, causing a jump in the nontax cost of this substitute, compared to the others. Yet if this nontax
cost is lower than the tax savings – for instance, if the regulatory penalty is $100,000 but the tax savings is $1
million – the planning will continue. Thus, social waste increases but no new revenue is collected.
32

I thank Reed Shuldiner for this metaphor.

33

This point is an extension of Professors Scholes and Wolfson’s observation that the tax constraints of all parties
must be considered. See Scholes & Wolfson, supra note 3, at 2. Likewise, nontax constraints of all parties are
relevant.
34

Recognizing the importance of legal opinions, the government recently tightened up standards for rendering
them. See IRS Issues Proposed Circular 230 Regs, 2001TNT 9-6 (Jan. 12,2001). Similarly, the government has
proposed enhanced disclosure and registration requirements for tax shelters. For a discussion, see N.Y. State Bar
Association Tax Section, Comments on the New Tax Shelter Regulations, 90 Tax Notes 1447 (Dec. 11, 2000).
35

In a sense, the position of a friction is merely an aspect of its strength and continuity, since the party that
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likely tax accommodation parties such as dealers, foreign banks, insurance companies, pension
funds, Indian tribes, and charities. If a friction affects only some of these potential counterparties,
reformers should consider whether other counterparties would step in. For instance, if a securities
dealer cannot supply an avoidance transaction, can an insurance company supply it?
2. Some Usual Suspects
To sum up, a narrow rule can still stop a planning strategy as long as frictions prevent end
runs: Strong, discontinuous frictions must burden a key player in any transaction not covered by
the legal rule. While this is a fact-specific inquiry, it is worth listing three categories of frictions
that commonly affect sophisticated transactions: preferences of taxpayers regarding real activity,
the state of technology and markets, and legal and regulatory constraints other than tax. Each
category contains both continuous and discontinuous frictions and, depending upon the facts, the
same friction can have either quality.

a. Taxpayer Preferences Regarding “Real” Activity
Taxpayers share a variety of nontax preferences regarding their business activities. For
example, in addition to risk,36 timing can be important (e.g., how long must taxpayers hold an
asset37 or wait before taking a particular step),38 as can the extent of a taxpayer’s participation in a
venture.39 Whether weak or strong, these frictions tend to be continuous. One can always take a
nominally is affected by the friction will seek to pass the burden on to the taxpayer through a higher fee.
36

Some rules impose a tax when taxpayers take risk-reducing measures, presumably on the theory that riskreducing behavior is inelastic. See Daniel N. Shaviro, Risk-Based Rules and the Taxation of Capital Income, 50
Tax L. Rev. 643 (1995). Likewise, some tax rules deny a tax benefit to taxpayers who fail to take risk, on the
theory that this non-tax “price” allocates the tax benefit to those who should receive it (e.g., because they have
non-tax reasons for engaging in the benefit-generating behavior). See Shaviro, supra. More generally, the tax
system has tried to distinguish between risk-based and time-value-based returns, although developments in the
financial markets have undermined the distinction. See Warren, supra note 5, at 460.
37

See Section 901(k) (prescribing 15-day holding period for claim of foreign tax credit); Shaviro, supra note 16
(discussing 901(k) and Compaq case).
38

See Section 355(e) (control of distributing or controlled may not change hands within two years of spin-off);
Section 1091 (taxpayer may not repurchase asset within 30 days before or after sale at a loss).
39

See Section 469 (requiring “material participation”).
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little more risk, wait a little longer, or participate a bit more, and so marginal changes are less
likely to be significant. In contrast, other preferences about real activity may be discontinuous.
For instance, taxpayers have strong preferences about the control they exert over the investment40
and the political jurisdiction in which relevant activity occurs (e.g., inside or outside the United
States).41 Yet the sharpness and location of the discontinuity will vary with the facts. For
example, control may technically require 50% of the voting power, and so a change from 50.01%
to 49.99% may be quite significant. In some cases, though, 40% (or less) can represent effective
control (e.g., in a public firm with no other large shareholders).
b. The State of Technology and Markets
Tax planning is constrained not only by economic attributes that taxpayers demand, but
also by limits on what can be supplied. 42 If planners need a particular security, but securities
dealers cannot supply it at reasonable cost, the planning will not occur. This reality features
prominently in our case studies.43 Of particular relevance are the state of financial technology and
completeness of financial markets.44 For instance, assume a special tax is imposed where markets
40

For instance, taxpayers may have a relatively inelastic preference for owning more than 50% of an enterprise,
and so tax consequences might vary based on such control. See, e.g., Section 355(e).
41

Along with jurisdictional considerations, this friction helps explain why U.S. tax applies only to earnings that are
effectively connected to the United States. See Section 864(c). To the extent that economic actors have strong
non-tax reasons to do business in the United States, the U.S. government can tax them without fear that they will
substitute business activities offshore.
42

For instance, improvements in communications technology have made it easier for U.S. taxpayers to move
income-generating operations to low-tax jurisdictions. See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Globalization, Tax
Competition, and the Fiscal Crisis of the Welfare State, 113 Harv. L. Rev. 1573 (2000). Likewise, development
of new financial instruments has created planning opportunities. See Warren, supra note 5.

43

As discussed in Parts II and III, the “constructive ownership” provision is fairly effective, notwithstanding its
narrow scope, because dealers lack the ability to hedge the security that theoretically could avoid the rule, and thus
will not supply this transaction at tolerable cost. In contrast, the “constructive sale” provision is less effective –
even though this rule uses essentially the same statutory test – because dealers are able to hedge more effectively in
this context. They often can supply the requisite security for a price lower than the tax benefit from avoidance.
44

For instance, although taxpayers frequently hedge publicly traded securities, why don’t they hedge the value of
their future salary earnings, and then borrow against this hedged wealth? Under current law, a cash-basis taxpayer
arguably would not be taxed until the wage was actually earned, even though this money would be enjoyed far
earlier through the loan. Yet a tax rule is not needed to foreclose this strategy, since the relevant financial
transactions cannot be done at reasonable cost. Lenders will not lend at a reasonable interest rate – and may not
lend at all – unless the future wages are guaranteed (e.g., against the risk of being fired or having an expertise that
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are relatively complete (e.g., on publicly traded assets). Although the tax theoretically could be
avoided (e.g., by investing in private assets), taxpayers may pay the tax in order to enjoy benefits
of public trading.45
c. Accounting and Legal Constraints
A transaction that yields a tax benefit is considerably less appealing if prohibited, or
rendered more costly or risky, by a legal or regulatory regime other than the tax law. Legal
regimes are an especially fruitful source of discontinuous frictions because they often use arbitrary
distinctions. Legal frictions can be influential in at least four ways.
First, such regimes impose substantive preconditions. Some step is required for the
transaction to be legally binding or for parties to avoid legal penalties. For instance, so-called
over-the-counter derivatives transactions (i.e., derivatives acquired from a securities dealer,
instead of an organized exchange) are not legally enforceable unless the relevant parties satisfy
certain wealth tests.46 Ineligible parties cannot use these contracts in tax planning.
ceases to be profitable). Yet there currently is no insurance or derivatives market for wages of individuals, or even
for wages of professional groups (e.g., attorneys, doctors, carpenters, etc.). As Professor Shiller has observed,
although financial markets are far more developed than ever before, individuals still cannot hedge human capital,
as well as nonfungible assets such as closely-held businesses, investments in real property, and the like. Robert
Shiller, Irrational Exuberance (2000); see also Shaviro, supra note 36. However regrettable the incompleteness of
these markets may be for the economy as a whole, the silver lining is that certain tax planning strategies are
meaningfully constrained.
45

Benefits of public trading are well understood. See, e.g., Rebecca Rudnick, Who Should Pay the Corporate Tax
in a Flat Tax World, 39 Case W. Res. 965 (1989) (supplying liquidity); Bagehot, The Only Game in Town, Fin.
Analysts J. Mar-Apr. 1971, at 12 (reducing information disparity between buyers and sellers, and thus curing
lemons problem, by creating a pool of monitors and, more generally, by forming a price that incorporates available
information); See Ronald J. Gilson & Bernard Black, Does Venture Capital Require an Active Stock Market, J.
App. Corp. Fin. 36 (Winter 1999) (facilitating venture capital investments); See Fama & Jenson, Separation of
Ownership and Control, 26 J. L. & Econ. 301, 313 (1983) (facilitating use of equity compensation for
management).
46

Under the Commodities Exchange Act, so-called futures contracts generally are enforceable only if conducted
through an organized exchange. The Commodities Futures Trading Commission has spared investors who meet
minimum wealth requirements from these constraints. As a result, over-the-counter derivatives are clearly
enforceable for wealthy investors. See James Hamilton et al, A Guide to Federal Regulation of Derivatives (1998).
Congress recently developed and codified these exceptions in December 2000 legislation. See the Commodity
Futures Modernization Act of 2000. Constraints also arise under the federal securities laws. For instance, the
derivatives transactions of issuers and so-called affiliates and insiders are constrained by registration and holding
period requirements of Section 5 of the Securities Act and Rule 144, respectively, as well as by Section 16 of the
Securities Exchange Act.
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Second, enforcement of a legal right can be costly, especially against someone with no
assets. The risk of incurring these costs, so-called “credit risk,” can deter tax planning. For
example, since corporate taxpayers have a tax-based preference for debt (which generates
deductible interest) instead of equity (which generates nondeductible dividends), why is equity so
pervasive? Indeed, a basic principal of economics, so-called put-call parity, is that a share of
stock has the same cash flow as a debt security coupled with a forward contract to buy stock in
the future.47 Given this equivalence, why don’t corporations replace stock with debt and forward
contracts? According to Professor Schlunk, we should expect a high volume of these
transactions.48 Yet the dramatic erosion he predicts in the corporate tax base has been blocked so
far by significant frictions, including credit risk. Specifically, the interest deduction will be denied
if the debt and forward are too closely related. These two instruments would be treated as a
single equity security for tax purposes (e.g., if they are sold to the same investor, cannot be legally
separated, and have the same maturity date).49 To avoid this recharacterization, the corporation
theoretically could sell the debt and forward to separate investors.50 Yet it is not practical to sell a
forward contract by itself. What assurance is there that a public investor will honor it if the stock
price declines? The expense of suing each public investor renders a “naked” forward
47

A forward contract is a contract for one party to buy a designated amount of property from another for a
designated price on a specified future date. An example of the financial equivalence described above is that a share
of stock worth $100 generates the same cash flow as the following unit: a bond that sells for $100 and pays $123 in
three years, and a forward contract to buy stock in three years for $123. After three years, assume the stock is
worth $223. Investment in the stock obviously yields a profit of $123. So too does the bond and forward. The
bond yields a profit of $23 (i.e., in yielding $123 on a bond that cost $100). The forward yields a profit of $100 (in
permitting the investor to buy stock worth $223 for only $123). For a discussion of put-call parity, see Warren,
supra note 5.
48

See Schlunk, supra note 4.

49

See Notice 94-47 (debt that is mandatorily convertible is taxed as equity); Section 163l. The legislative history of
section 163l says that interest is disallowed if “part of an arrangement designed to result in such payment of the
instrument with or by reference to . . . stock, such as in the case of certain issuances of a forward contract in
connection with the issuance of debt.” Comm. Rep. P.L. 103-34, reprinted in CCH Standard Federal Tax
Reporter, at 23,019..
50

Cf. Prv. Ltr. 200052027 (Jan. 8, 2001) (Section 163l does not apply to issuer that issues notes and buys put
options from separate investors).
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unworkable.51 Instead, the forward contract must be secured by collateral, such as a Treasury
bond. Yet an investor seeking an equity return usually is not satisfied with the low yield of a
Treasury bond, and so the issuer must kick in a significant (nondeductible) fee (e.g., 2%).52 This
expense, coupled with the cost of two public offerings, renders the transaction uncommon.53
Third, agency costs can impede tax planning. Self-interested agents may choose not to
pursue otherwise promising strategies that are complex or risky, or take considerable time and
effort to develop. For instance, evidence of success may be required before an arbitrary date
(e.g., the cutoff date for an investment banker’s annual bonus). Likewise, pursuit of the taxreducing strategy may require an organizational form that is less effective at constraining agency
costs (e.g., a limited partnership instead of a corporation). In some cases, taxpayers will choose
better governance over tax reduction.
Finally, the regulatory regime might be relevant in determining, not whether the
51

To avoid this problem, the issuer theoretically could enter into the forward contract with a securities dealer. Yet
although credit risk is less of a concern, the securities laws make this transaction impractical. The dealer will
hedge through short sales in the public markets. These sales will probably render the dealer an “underwriter” for
purposes of Section 5 of the Securities Act. The dealer would thus have to deliver a prospectus, a step that is
impractical, especially if the dealer is hedging dynamically through a perpetual stream of short sales (and thus
would have to provide constantly updated disclosure).
52

The fee is not deductible as interest. Although the taxpayer might deduct it as a business expense, the fee
arguably should be capitalized under Indopco as a cost of the offering. See Indopco Inc. v. Commissioner, 503
U.S. 79 (1992). Yet basis in the equity being sold has no value to the issuer, since section 1032 provides
nonrecognition treatment.

53

I am aware of only two public transactions using this structure. See Browning Ferris Industries, Inc. 7.25%
Automatic Common Exchange Securities (June 23, 1995); MCN 5,100,000 8.75% PRIDES (Apr. 22, 1996). The
more common alternative, Feline Prides, is somewhat less costly but involves more tax risk. See, e.g., Conseco,
Inc. Conseco Financing Trust IV 10,000,000 Feline Prices (Dec. 8, 1997). The debt and forward are sold to the
same investor (averting the cost of a second offering) and the debt serves as collateral for the forward. Three
features discourage recharacterization as equity for tax purposes, although the case is not free of doubt. First,
holders may sell the debt upon pledging a Treasury bond as collateral (at which point the issuer begins incurring a
fee, but this cost arises in only the rare case when holders sell the bond); second, the bond matures six months after
the forward, and holders may elect to settle the forward with cash while retaining the bond; third, in some
offerings, the bond’s interest rate resets when the forward matures to encourage holders to keep the bond. To an
extent, complexity and tax uncertainty have kept this structure from becoming pervasive, although many
transactions have been done. An understanding of the credit-risk constraint would enable the government to block
the transaction with a narrow rule, such as a notice or regulation interpreting section 163l. The rule would
disallow the deduction of interest from any debt that collateralizes a forward contract for the issuer’s equity. The
only structure that would avoid this rule is the one described in text, and issuers are unlikely to use it.
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transaction itself can be done, but how the transaction would affect the taxpayer’s other business.
For instance, regulators require securities dealers and banks to have minimum levels of capital.
These institutions may be unwilling to engage in a tax-reducing transaction – whether for
themselves or for a client – if they would incur a “capital charge” under these regimes, and thus
would need more liquid capital to satisfy regulators.54
Unappealing financial accounting or adverse treatment by rating agencies can also have a
chilling effect on tax planning. In an efficient market, these constraints would not matter.
Investors simply would look beyond accounting or rating-agency conventions to the underlying
financial reality. But these conventions do matter when the market is not perfectly efficient.55 For
instance, it can be expensive for investors to look through these conventions (e.g., if the investor
must value particular assets or liabilities on her own). Nor is it profitable to develop more
accurate numbers if other investors, who set the market price, will continue to be influenced (or,
indeed, misled) by the old ones.56 In any event, managers and their advisors jealously guard
54

Under the regulatory capital regime for securities dealers, the liabilities they may incur – including indebtedness
and dealer activities such as short sales – are limited by the amount of “regulatory capital” the dealers have.
Activities that reduces the amount of regulatory capital bear a significant opportunity cost. The main way to
refresh the supply of regulatory capital is to issue common stock, but this method of funding is more expensive
than debt. Not only is no interest deduction available. More importantly, the return expected by equity investors is
considerably higher than a dealer’s borrowing cost. Regulatory capital charges feature in the discussion of both
Section 1259 and Section 1260. See infra Parts II and III. See also Myron Scholes et al, Tax Planning, Regulatory
Capital Planning, and Financial Reporting Strategy for Commercial Banks, Rev. Fin. Stud. 625 (1990) (analyzing
commercial bank investment portfolio management to discern tradeoff between regulatory capital and tax
planning); A. Beatty et al, Managing Financial Reports of Commercial Banks: The Influence of Taxes, 33 J.
Accounting Res. 231 (1995) (focusing on categories of decisions by banks, including loan charge-offs, issuance of
new securities, pension settlement, etc.); J. Collins et al, Bank Differences in the Coordination of Regulatory
Capital, Earnings and Taxes, 33 J. Accounting Res. 263 (studying decisions of particular banks over time).
55

See generally Sanford J. Grossman, On the Efficiency of Competitive Stock Markets When Traders Have
Diverse Information, 31 J. Fin. 573 (1976); Sanford J. Grossman & Joseph Stiglitz, On the Impossibility of
Informationally Efficient Markets, 70 Am Econ. Rev. 393 (1980).
56

An analogy may be drawn to the “noise trader” literature. If unsophisticated investors (or “noise” traders) are
paying too much for tulips or Internet stocks, sophisticated investors should engage in short sales that yield a profit
once the bubble bursts and, indeed, should help it to burst. Why, then, do bubbles ever occur? The “noise trader”
literature contends that sophisticated investors will do these short sales only if they expect the market to decline in
the near term. If there is doubt about when (or whether) the noise traders will recognize their error, arbitrage
becomes very risky, and less of this service is supplied. See generally J. Bradford De Long, et al., The Size and
Incidence of the Losses from Noise Trading, 44 J. Fin. 681 (1989); J. Bradford De Long, et al., Noise Trader Risk
in Financial Markets, 98 J. Pol. Econ. 703 (1990); Andrei Shleifer & Lawrence H. Summers, The Noise Trader
Approach to Finance, J. Econ. Persp., Spring 1990, at 19.

Schizer, Frictions as a Constraint on Tax Planning

Page 19

accounting and rating agency treatment.57 These efforts are documented in empirical studies,58
and also in anecdotal evidence from equity research analysts,59 and from investment bankers who
develop tax and accounting arbitrages.60 Likewise, in my experience as a tax practitioner, a taxreducing strategy often is “dead” if the accounting treatment is unappealing. A caveat, though, is
that accounting rules can prove malleable. Often, a transaction can be modified to attain both tax
and accounting goals.
D. Potential Pitfalls of Frictions-Based Strategy
When frictions are sufficiently strong and hard to avoid, they enable narrow tax rules to be
effective, thereby averting political, overbreadth, and administrability problems of a broader rule.
On the other hand, if the friction is too weak or easy to avoid, reliance on it can be
counterproductive because planning will continue in more wasteful form. In addition, four other
problems can undermine reliance on frictions.
1. Information Costs
First, tax reformers must learn a wide range of institutional details, including the securities
and commodities laws, the state of financial technology, accounting and broker-dealer regulation.
This seems like a tall order for government officials who already are overworked, underpaid, and
may have limited transactional experience. The challenge, moreover, is to ensure that frictions
block – not just a particular avoidance strategy – but all avoidance strategies. Tax reformers
57

For discussion of these issues, see David M. Schizer, Tax Constraints on Indexed Options, U. Pa. L. Rev.
(forthcoming 2001).
58

See, e.g., Ellen Engel et al., Debt-Hybrid Securities, 37 J. Accounting Res. 249 (1999) (studying MIPS and other
securities treated as debt for tax purposes but not for rating agency and accounting purposes; noting that firms
incur extra expenses totaling approximately 4% of offering price, or $10 million in the average offering, to secure
better accounting treatment for otherwise comparable securities). See also Shackelford & Shevlin, supra note 6.
(describing studies of tradeoff between accounting and tax reduction in use of LIFO, compensation, depreciation,
income shifting, capital structure, acquisitions, etc.).
59

To emphasize the costliness of looking through accounting conventions, Andrew Steinerman, a research analyst
at Bear Stearns, asked, “When you read an academic paper, do you read all the sources cited in the footnotes?”
60

As one put it, “If the market were truly efficient, I could not make so much money doing this – but have you seen
my house?”
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must, in effect, prove a negative. There must be no viable way to avoid the narrow rule.61 For
instance, assume a reform is meant to stop a tax-motivated use of derivatives. Once reformers
accomplish this mission, which is no easy task (as the first case study shows), they must consider
whether the same tax benefit can be attained without derivatives – for instance, with insurance
contracts and offshore corporations (which feature prominently in the second case study).
Admittedly, perfect foresight is not realistic. But some success at uncovering the relevant
information should be possible. Nor is this effort always more daunting than the administrability
and political challenges of broader rules. For narrow transactional responses, reformers need to
understand all aspects of the targeted transaction, not just the tax analysis. Although the
transaction’s promoter will be reluctant to share this information, competitors are often willing to
offer anonymous tips. Organizations such as the New York State Bar Association may also be
fruitful sources of information. To some extent, reformers already are asking about frictions,
although in an ad hoc manner that often depends on which officials are working on the reform,
what experience they have, and whom they know.62
Commentators can provide valuable assistance here in identifying and evaluating
significant frictions. In addition, more systematic and sustained government efforts are needed.
Tax reformers should coordinate with other federal agencies, for instance, to ask the SEC about a
securities law issue or the Federal Reserve about a bank regulatory issue. To some extent, this
coordination already occurs. Yet turf battles can impede cooperation. Seeking input can lead to
delay and loss of control. The success of cooperation often depends on personalities and
relationships of particular staffers.63 It would be useful to institutionalize such coordination, so an
appropriate level is always supplied and the process is smoother. Although these steps are not
always easy or cheap, the government often will avoid potentially greater costs of a tax reform
61

I thank Diane Ring for this observation.

62

I am indebted to Ron Pearlman for this insight.

63

Professor Pearlman is also the source of this observation.
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that is ineffective or, alternatively, very broad. (I say “often” because in some cases a reliable
friction will not be present.)
2. Instability
Another disadvantage of relying on frictions is they may prove unstable. Although a legal
or accounting rule may seem to constrain avoidance, the relevant rule may change or creative
advisors may circumvent this obstacle. Likewise, even if the financial markets are unable to
supply a particular security today, tomorrow may be different. Indeed, two pressing academic
debates about the future of taxation — the impact of financial innovation and tax competition —
derive from erosion of frictions.64 Of course, this process can work the other way as well. A
friction that seems unimportant today can become more daunting over time.65 Yet the trend is
toward less effective frictions, due to globalization, deregulation, and more complete financial
markets. In response, reformers must assess the relevant friction’s durability. They also must
monitor the friction even after the reform is enacted. This process is helped if tax reformers
coordinate with other parts of the government (e.g., the SEC, CFTC, etc.), but the information
costs are real.
3. Distributional Effects
Rules that depend on frictions can redistribute tax burdens in random or undesirable ways.
The problem is that some taxpayers may be uniquely able to avoid the friction. For instance, if
securities dealers cannot supply a particular avoidance transaction, but insurance companies can, a
reform could transfer wealth from dealers to insurers. Likewise, if a tax benefit is conditioned on
adverse accounting,66 the benefit may be claimed only by firms that are relatively unconcerned
64

See, e.g., Warren, supra note 5; Avi-Yonah, supra note 42.

65

For instance, under the wash sale rules of Section 1091, taxpayers who sell a security at a loss cannot recognize it
currently unless they wait 30 days before repurchasing the security. While such a long period may have been
needed when section 1091 was enacted, a shorter interval would be sufficient in today’s volatile markets.
66

For instance, the Treasury proposed (unsuccessfully) to deny interest deductions to “MIPS” and certain other
securities not treated as debt for financial accounting purposes. For a description of MIPS, see Gergen & Schmitz,
supra note 7.
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about this regime. Since indifference to the friction has little to do with ability to pay, normatively
comparable firms will be taxed differently.
In many cases, wealthier taxpayers will have an advantage. For instance, regimes that
protect investors (including the securities and commodities laws, broker dealer regulations, and
the like) usually have exceptions for wealthy investors, who are thought to need less protection.
Moreover, if a fixed cost is needed to circumvent a friction, such as a fee to an expert, wealthy
taxpayers can amortize this cost over greater tax savings. On the other hand, if the cost of the
friction rises with the size of the transaction (e.g., a regulatory penalty or fee to a counterparty
that is scaled to the size of the transaction), wealthier taxpayers will not have a particular edge.
4. Overbreadth and Nontax Effects
Just as a friction can be underinclusive in failing to deter the wealthiest taxpayers, so too
can it be overinclusive. For example, a recent accounting rule for derivatives (inadvertently)
deters tax planning, but the rule also discourages useful transactions that are not tax motivated.67
Once tax authorities begin to rely on the friction, they may become a constituency for keeping it,
notwithstanding its unfortunate nontax effects (e.g., on corporate governance or capital market
efficiency). The tax reform may be harder to defend politically if it relies on an unpopular friction.
Lobbyists will ask, for instance, “why should the tax law follow the accounting rule, which is bad
policy anyway?”
On the other hand, what if the friction serves a useful nontax function? It would be
undesirable for the tax law to undermine the friction. For instance, assume the relevant friction is
the taxpayer’s desire for public trading. Various governmental efforts support public trading,
such as the SEC’s registration of public securities and monitoring of trading practices. These
public investments are often defended because of benefits to third parties of liquid markets (socalled positive externalities). For instance, more accurate pricing of assets provides valuable
guidance even for people who are not currently trading. What if the tax burden on publicly-traded
67

The rule requires certain hedges to be marked to market. For a discussion, see infra Part II. A number of
commentators, including Alan Greenspan, have voiced concern about the nontax effects of this rule.
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securities is raised? Ideally, no one would stop trading in these markets (i.e., because the nontax
benefits outweigh the tax savings). But if taxpayers do stop trading, they personally lose the
benefits of these transactions, as do third parties (e.g., if assets are priced less efficiently).
Similarly, it is undesirable for the tax law to create political pressure to repeal a socially
valuable friction. For instance, assume a regulated financial institution cannot claim a tax
deduction without triggering adverse regulatory treatment (e.g., accounting losses that require
regulators to take over the institution). If this tough regulatory treatment is socially useful (e.g.,
in ensuring the solvency of regulated institutions), it would be undesirable for regulators to
weaken their standards solely to make the tax deduction easier to claim.68 In light of these risks,
reformers should prefer a friction that is so persuasive that taxpayers generally will not be swayed
by competing tax considerations to ignore it in a particular case or to seek its repeal.
* * *
To sum up, the appeal of a narrow tax rule – whether compared with the status quo, or
with a broader measure – depends to a significant extent on frictions. If persuasive frictions are
not present, a narrow rule may not be worth doing. Even if it is, a broader rule is likely to be
better. On the other hand, what if strong discontinuous frictions are present? A narrow rule is
more likely to be worth doing. Indeed, a narrow rule sometimes will be better than a broader
rule, although costs and benefits of each alternative must be compared (e.g., the cost of learning
about and monitoring the friction vs. the cost of introducing enough nuance in a broad rule to
avoid overbreadth).
In short, all narrow reforms are not created equal. Given their pervasiveness, it is
68

See Cottage Savings Association v. Commissioner, 111 S. Ct. 1503 (1991) (through Memorandum R-49, Federal
Home Loan Bank Board weakened its regulatory accounting standards to enable savings and loan associations to
claim tax losses without triggering losses for regulatory accounting purposes). A similar dynamic played out when
banks petitioned the Federal Reserve to designate so-called trust preferred securities as “tier one” capital. These
securities were eligible for a tax deduction, but their debt-like features rendered them, initially at least, an
insufficiently reliable source of core capital for regulated banks. Eventually, though, the federal reserve relaxed its
standards enough to offer these securities a “tier one” designation. Banking experts question whether the decision
was consistent with sound banking practices and international agreements such as the Basil accord. Nevertheless,
the Federal Reserve apparently was eager to give banks access to better tax treatment. See Tom Pratt, Fed Gives
Go-Ahead for New Form of Tier 1 Capital, Investment Dealer’s Digest, May 27, 1996.
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important for reformers to predict, through fact-specific inquiries, which of the above results is
most likely for a given reform. Admittedly, this inquiry can be difficult. Yet these efforts are
needed to ensure that narrow reforms, the day-to-day grist of tax reform, are playing a
constructive role. While this genre of policy making is less satisfying than more fundamental
reforms, ambitious alternatives are politically unrealistic for now. Thus, in addition to studying
first-best solutions, commentators should offer guidance about more modest reforms that are
under active consideration. More information is needed, and legal academics should help gather
it. Admittedly, broker-dealer regulation and credit risk seem far removed from classic tax policy
measures such as the Haig Simons definition of income,69 and are sometimes more obscure and
inaccessible. Yet it is hard to craft normatively appealing transactional responses without
understanding these ingredients of elasticity.

II. CONSTRUCTIVE SALES: WHEN FRICTIONS ARE WEAK
To illustrate the importance of frictions, the following Parts compare two recent
transactional responses involving the taxation of derivative financial instruments. These reforms
use essentially the same statutory language. Under each, favorable tax treatment is still available
as long as subtle changes are made in the derivative’s economic return. This strategy is
commonly used to avoid the constructive sale rule of Section 1259. As Part II shows, the
targeted transaction, use of derivatives in effect to sell appreciated assets without paying tax,
remains pervasive. In contrast, frictions keep taxpayers from using the same strategy – a
derivative with a modified economic return – to avoid the constructive ownership rule of Section
1260, which was enacted two years later. As Part III shows, taxpayers have stopped using
derivatives to attain the relevant tax objective, better tax treatment of hedge fund returns,
although other strategies involving insurance are coming into wider use. While each reform raises
69

In widely cited works, Robert Haig and Henry Simons defined income as the sum of consumption and the market
value of increases in the value of the taxpayer’s property. See Robert Murray Haig, The Concept of Income –
Economic and Legal Aspects, in The Federal Income Tax 1, 7 (Robert Murray Haig ed., 1921): Henry C. Simons,
Personal Income Taxation 50 (1938).
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a number of normative and political issues, a comprehensive exploration is beyond this Article’s
scope. Rather, the emphasis here is on avoidance of these seemingly similar measures, and
frictions that stand in the way.
Given the private nature of these transactions, reliable and detailed information is not easy
to acquire. I draw on my practice experience in this area, as well as on more than thirty
conversations during 2000 and 2001 with investment bankers, tax and securities lawyers. This
research focuses on major Wall Street investment banks, which have been the leading innovators
in over-the-counter derivatives, rather than on smaller institutions elsewhere in the country. A
condition of these conversations was that persons and institutions will not be identified.
For each case study, the first Section describes the targeted transaction and statutory
response. To evaluate various methods of avoiding these measures, the second Section describes
the relevant tax benefit from such avoidance, the effect of requiring taxpayers to accept a
modified economic return, and the impact of other frictions. The third Section briefly considers
normative implications of these empirical findings.
A. Targeted Transaction
Under Section 1259, capital gains tax is due not only when appreciated assets are sold, but
also when they are hedged in some cases.70 The measure was a response to growing use of short
sales against the box71 and other hedging strategies involving derivatives.72 These transactions
70

“Hedging” in this context means the asset’s owner enters into a separate transaction that, in effect, cancels out
the economic return in the appreciated asset (e.g., when one goes up, the other goes down). See footnotes 71 and
72, infra, for descriptions of short sales against the box and forward contracts.
71

A short sale is a bet that the stock price will decline, implemented by selling borrowed shares. The seller
promises to return shares to the lender in the future, and hopes declines in the stock price will make these
“replacement” shares cheaper. What distinguishes a short sale “against the box” is that the short-seller already
owns stock identical to the stock she is borrowing. By holding two offsetting positions – the short sale (a bet that
the price will decline) and shares of stock (a bet that the price will rise) – the taxpayer is perfectly hedged. If the
stock price declines, any losses on the stock she owns is offset by an equivalent gain on the short sale. Thus,
subsequent volatility in the stock price does not affect her, and she also can spend the cash proceeds she receives
from the short sale. For all practical purposes, the taxpayer feels as if she has sold the stock.
72

For instance, assume the appreciated asset has a zero basis and a $100 fair market value. Instead of selling the
asset and paying tax on $100 of gain, the taxpayer enters into a forward contract committing her to sell the stock in
three years at $115. If the stock declines to $90, she loses $10 on the stock but makes $10 on the forward (i.e.,
because the ability to sell for $115 becomes correspondingly more valuable as the market price declines).
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offered benefits of a sale, including reduced risk and cash proceeds, but for formalistic reasons
were not taxed as sales.73 Even though short sales against the box date back at least to 1932,74 it
became easier in the last two decades to borrow the stock needed for this transaction.75 Tax
legislation in 1978 protected stock lenders from adverse tax consequences.76 Brokers also had
more stock to lend because investors were keeping shares in brokerage accounts (e.g., instead of
in bank vaults).77 Also, substitutes for short sales against the box became available in the overthe-counter derivatives market during the 1980s and 1990s. These hedges could be used, for
instance, when a short sale would violate the securities laws. 78
73

The theory was that, for fungible property, a transfer of title or control was needed to identify the shares being
sold (and thus their basis) — a necessary function as taxpayers traditionally have been permitted to designate the
shares being sold. Thus, tax was not owed unless and until the taxpayer delivered her appreciated shares to
“cover” the short (i.e., in returning shares to the party that who lent the shares used in the short sale). See
generally Peter L. Faber, Andrea S. Kramer and William R. Pomierski, The Ownership and Disposition of
Property: New Rules for Old Problems, Taxes 768, 775 (Dec. 1997); Edward Kleinbard, Risky and Riskless
Positions in Securities, Taxes 783, 793 (Dec. 1993).
74

See, e.g., Bingham v. Commissioner, 27 B.T.A. 186 (1932).

75

SEC and NASD rules generally prevent a broker-dealer from even offering to make a short sale before locating a
source from which to borrow stock. See NYSE Rule 440C; NASD Rule 3370(b)(2). For a discussion of this
“locate” requirement, see Martin Shubik, Michael Powers, and David Schizer, Sin, Short Selling, Taxes, Bubbles,
and the Price of Shares (working draft on file with author). The reader may wonder why it was necessary to
borrow stock since the taxpayer already had some. Why not simply lend your own lot to your broker, so the broker
could use these shares to execute your short sale? A revenue ruling cautioned that such behavior would trigger tax.
See Rev. Rul. 72-478, 1972-2 C.B. 487 (“A transaction is a valid short sale which will not be considered
consummated until securities are delivered to close the sale where the broker did not borrow identical securities
held in the taxpayer's accounts for delivery to the purchaser.”).
76

Taxable investors worried that, in lending their stock, they would be treated as making a taxable sale. But see
Section 1058 (providing nonrecognition to lender of stock when certain conditions are satisfied). Tax-exempt
investors feared that fees earned from lending stock would be taxable as “unrelated business taxable income.” But
see section 512(a)(5) (providing that income from securities loans is not UBTI); see also Committee Report on P.L.
95-345 (1978), reprinted in CCH, at 22,830.14 (describing Congress’s concern that securities lending not trigger
adverse tax consequences).
77

Indeed, if the stock is held in a margin account, the broker does not need permission to lend the shares. See SEC
Rules 15c3-3; see also House Rep. No. 102-414 (Jan. 22, 1992). While permission is needed to lend stock in
“cash” accounts, such permission is routinely granted. Indeed, this is often a condition the broker requires in
setting up the account.
78

For instance, securities laws bar senior corporate officers and large shareholders from engaging in short sales, see
Section 16(c) of the Securities Exchange Act, but allow “synthetic” short sales with derivatives. See Rule 16c-4.
See David M. Schizer, Executives and Hedging: The Fragile Legal Foundations of Incentive Compatibility, 100
Colum. L. Rev. (2000). Section 5 of the 33 Act would also prevent sales of restricted stock, but hedging this stock
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Notwithstanding this erosion of frictions, a lot of capital gain was still taxed. For instance,
individuals realized $170.4 billion of net capital gain in 1995.79 In some cases, taxpayers
presumably were not willing to incur the (relatively low) transaction costs to use short sales
against the box, including fees for lawyers and for borrowing stock. Taxable gain also derived
from the growing popularity of mutual funds. Because these funds were (and are) ranked on
pretax returns,80 fund managers have an incentive to maximize this return – as opposed to aftertax returns. As a result, managers trade actively, leaving investors with high tax bills. In effect,
agency costs have inflated taxes.
Even so, hedging was becoming increasingly common and well publicized. High profile
articles were appearing in the press.81 In response, the Treasury persuaded Congress to enact the
“constructive sale” rule in 1997. Under Section 1259, taxpayers recognize gain (but not loss), as
if they have made a sale,82 whenever they use a short sale, forward contract, swap, or comparable
with collars is sometimes thought to be permissible.
79

See Therese Cruciano, Individual Income Tax Returns 1995, available on www.irs.gov.

80

The most important of these rankings is sponsored by Morningstar. In my view, there is no satisfying answer to
the puzzle of why funds are ranked in this imprecise way, since the more relevant number for taxable investors
should be after-tax return. The usual answer is that investor’s tax positions are so varied that an after-tax ranking
is not feasible. Although this is true to an extent, an after-tax ranking based on plausible assumptions should be
feasible (e.g., 20% long-term capital gains rate, 39.6% short-term capital gains rate, etc.). Vanguard has been
trying to develop such a ranking system, presumably because its passively managed funds do not trade as
frequently and thus would fare well. Yet their ranking has not become the market standard, at least for now.
81

Particular attention was focused on a public offering of stock in Estee Lauder. Instead of selling their own
shares, family members borrowed each other’s stock, thereby rendering the public offering a short sale against the
box. As the family members did not plan to “cover” the short until after they died, the tax deferral ordinarily
offered by a short sale against the box would become tax forgiveness. The New York Times followed up with
coverage of various other large hedging transactions. See Henriques & Norris, Rushing Away from Taxes: The
Capital Gains Bypass – A Special Report, N.Y. Times, Dec. 1, 1996, at A1.
82

For consequences of a constructive sale, see Section 1259(a) (“If there is a constructive sale of an appreciated
financial position (1) the taxpayer shall recognize gain as if such position were sold, assigned, or otherwise
terminated at its fair market value on the date of such constructive sale (and any gain shall be taken into account
for the taxable year which includes such date), and (2) for purposes of applying this title for periods after the
constructive sale (A) proper adjustment shall be made in the amount of any gain or loss realized with respect to
such position for any gain or loss subsequently realized with respect to such position for any gain taken into
account by reason of paragraph (1), and (B) the holding period of such position shall be determined as if such
position were originally acquired on the date of such constructive sale.”).
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transaction to eliminate “substantially all” of the risk of loss and opportunity for gain in an
appreciated security.83
This language reflects a political compromise. Many in the Treasury would have preferred
a broader measure, but did not believe one could be enacted. Since members of Congress were
thought to be committed to the realization rule,84 the measure is limited to hedges that closely
resemble sales. The securities industry was also lobbying to keep the reform narrow. A narrow
measure could still offer symbolic benefits, which were important to many officials in the Treasury
and Congress. But to what extent has Section 1259 stopped hedging?
B. Frictions and Avoidance
To answer this question, this Section briefly considers the tax benefit from hedging, and
83

For a detailed discussion of the statutory language and technical issues it raises, see David M. Schizer, Hedging
Under Section 1259, Tax Notes (July 1998). Section 1259(c)(1) offers the statutory definition of a constructive
sale:
(c) CONSTRUCTIVE SALE – For purposes of this section –
(1) IN GENERAL. – A taxpayer shall be treated as having made a constructive sale of an
appreciated financial position [defined generally as appreciated stock, debt, or partnership
interests in 1259(b)(1)] if the taxpayer (or a related person) –
(A) enters into a short sale of the same or substantially identical property,
(B) enters into an offsetting notional principal contract with respect to the same or
substantially identical property,
(C) enters into a futures or forward contract to deliver the same or substantially
identical property,
(D) in the case of an appreciated financial position that is a short sale or a contract
described in subparagraph (B) or (C) with respect to any such property, acquires the
same or substantially identical property, or
(E) to the extent provided by the Secretary in regulations, enters into 1 or more other
transactions (or acquires 1 or more positions) that have substantially the same effect
as a transaction described in any of the preceding subparagraphs.
The common theme of these enumerated transactions, according to widely-cited legislative history, is that these
“financial transactions . . . have the effect of eliminating substantially of the taxpayer’s risk of loss and opportunity
for income or gain with respect to the appreciated financial position.” Comm. Rep. on. P.L. 105-34, reprinted in
CCH Standard Federal Tax Reporter, at 31,130.
84

Under the realization rule, tax is not due until appreciated property is sold.
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then analyzes the strength, discontinuity, and position of relevant frictions. Hedging proves
difficult for positions worth less than $1 million, but viable, although not cost-free, for larger
positions.
1. Tax Benefit
The tax benefit from hedging is deferral.85 The longer the hedge lasts, the greater this
benefit. Tax is avoided altogether if the hedge lasts until the taxpayer dies, since the basis in
appreciated property “steps up.”86 The higher the capital gains tax rate, the greater the benefit of
delaying or avoiding the tax. In the same tax bill that enacted Section 1259, Congress reduced
the individual long-term capital gains rate for stock from 28% to 20%, thereby reducing the tax
benefit from hedging.
2. Derivatives With Modified Return
The main way to avoid Section 1259, understood by the government and taxpayer alike, is
to retain some exposure to the hedged asset’s return – in other words, to use a partial hedge. For
example, if an asset is worth $100, the taxpayer can accept risk of loss from $100 to $95 (by
buying a put at $95), while retaining opportunity for gain from $100 to $115 (by selling a call at
$115).87 This combination of owning a put and selling a call is known as a “collar.”88 Other

85

By deferring a tax, taxpayers can continue to invest, and earn a return on, money that otherwise would fund the
tax. For a discussion, see David M. Schizer, Realization as Subsidy, 73 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1549 (1998).
86

If a taxpayer dies holding property worth $100 with a zero basis, the heir takes the property with a $100 basis.
Thus, the income tax never reaches this appreciation. See Section 1014.
87

The “put” option offers the taxpayer the right, but not the obligation, to sell at $95, thereby guaranteeing her at
least that price. In selling the call option, the taxpayer gives her counterparty the right (but not the obligation) to
buy at $115. Thus, the taxpayer will not benefit from any appreciation above $115. The market convention is to
use a spread equal to twenty percent of the hedged asset’s fair market value on the date of the hedge. This practice
derives from a report of the New York State Bar Association. See New York State Bar Association Tax Section,
Comments on H.R. 846 3 (May 21, 1997), reprinted in 97 TNT 103-11. In the interests of full disclosure, I was a
principal drafter of that report, but the 20% test reflects the consensus of the organization’s executive committee.
88

The legislative history directs the Treasury to develop standards for collars in prospective regulations:
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derivatives, such as swaps and forward contracts, can offer the same result.89
In some cases, taxpayers would rather make a taxable sale than remain exposed, even in
this limited way. The point of tax deferral, after all, is to earn a return on money that otherwise
would fund the tax. This benefit is especially appealing if this money can be invested in any asset,
as under prior law. A short sale against the box yielded 95% of the hedged asset’s value as cash,
which could be invested in anything.90 Under Section 1259, in contrast, a portion of the
taxpayer’s deferred tax – and, indeed, of her entire position – must remain invested in the hedged
asset. If this asset appreciates, a collar is usually better than a taxable sale. But as Appendix A
shows, if the hedged asset declines in value, a taxable sale may be better, especially if the tax rate
is low and sale proceeds are invested profitably. Thus, if the taxpayer has no confidence in the
hedged asset, a taxable sale may be preferable. In my experience, though, investors usually
accord some value to the retained exposure. For many, risk functions here as a weak, continuous
friction. A key question is whether other frictions burden partial hedges.
3. Other Frictions
Four types of investors are considered. For those with stock worth less than $1 million,

It is anticipated that the Treasury regulations, when issued, will provide specific standards for determining
whether several common transactions will be treated as constructive sales. One such transaction is a
`collar.’ . . . In order to determine whether collars have substantially the same effect as the transactions
specified in the provision, it is anticipated that Treasury regulations will provide specific standards that
take into account various factors with respect to the appreciated financial position, including its volatility.
Similarly, it is expected that several aspects of the collar transaction will be relevant, including the spread
between the put and call prices, the period of the transaction, and the extent to which the taxpayer retains
the right to periodic payments on the appreciated financial position (e.g., the dividends on collared stock).
The Committee expects that the Treasury regulations with respect to collars will be applied prospectively,
except in cases to prevent abuse. See Comm. Rep. on P.L. 105-34.
89

90

See Schizer, supra note 83, at 351-53.

In return, the taxpayer paid a modest (deductible) fee for borrowing the stock (e.g., less than one percent of the
hedged asset’s value), while foregoing any return on the five percent of proceeds that could not be withdrawn.
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frictions are strongest. While short sales against the box were feasible for this group, over-thecounter derivatives are not. Under the commodities laws, these transactions are not enforceable
for those with less than $1 million of assets.91 Nor is deferral of only $300,000 of tax92 enough
to justify fixed costs, including fees of the legal advisor and securities dealer. At leading
investment banks, “private client services” investment bankers, whose core business is to arrange
hedges for individuals, generally will not undertake a transaction of this size. Since they cannot
use over-the-counter derivatives, retail investors might use options transactions in public markets
(e.g., to construct collars).93 Yet in recent years, the term of most publicly-traded options (e.g.,
one year or less) has been too short to provide meaningful deferral, even if the taxpayer is willing
to pay for tax advice.94 This transaction will become more common as the market for long-term
exchange-traded options (e.g., LEAPS and FLEX options) becomes cheaper and more liquid. In
addition, vehicles may be formed in which small investors hedge together. For now, though,
frictions can be meaningful for this group.95

91

See supra note 46.

92

The taxpayer is assumed to have a basis of zero, a federal tax rate of 20%, and a state tax rate of 10%.

93

For a discussion of the difference between over-the-counter and publicly-traded derivatives, see supra note 46
and accompanying text.
94

Taxpayers can enter into a series of hedges, though. For instance, when the stock is at $100, they can enter into
a 100-120 one-year collar. If the stock is worth $150 after a year, the taxpayer can settle the collar with a $30 cash
payment, without selling the stock. Then the taxpayer can enter into a new one-year collar. There are two tax
costs here, though. Under the straddle rules, losses in settling the short call will not be deductible unless the
qualified-covered-call exception applies. See Section 1092(c)(4). The problem is that this exception does not
apply if the stock is already part of a straddle, as it arguably is (i.e., the stock and the put). Second, if the stock
price declines, the taxpayer’s profit will shift from the stock (where it was long-term capital gain) to the put (where
it is short-term capital gain).
95

Since Section 1259 has an exception for short-term hedges (i.e., those covered within 30 days of the end of the
taxable year), retail investors can still use the short sale against the box for short-term hedging. Yet the strategy is
less viable for long term hedging. While the taxpayer can do a series of short-term hedges, she must accept total
exposure (i.e., no hedging except for market risk) for sixty days between these hedges. Another disadvantage of
this strategy is that it may convert what otherwise would be long-term capital gain into short-term capital gain or
give rise to losses that may not be deducted currently. For a discussion of this issue, see Schizer, supra note 83.
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In contrast, taxpayers with positions worth $1 million to $60 million are the core private
client services clientele. Every major investment bank, as well as numerous boutiques, have active
hedging desks for such clients. The necessary derivative can be supplied at a reasonable cost – a
key difference between Sections 1259 and 1260, as discussed in Part III.96 At two to three
percent of the hedged asset’s value, the fee may seem high. But it is rarely paid in cash. Instead,
clients give the dealer opportunity for gain (worth relatively more) to pay for protection from risk
of loss (worth relatively less). As a result, clients pay in a currency, opportunity for gain, that
they do not especially value.97 Nor are the commodities laws an obstacle, since wealthier clients
typically are exempt.98 Taxpayers often also can receive up to 85% of the hedged asset’s value in
cash, which can be reinvested.99 Given the weakness of these frictions, these transactions are very
common. The precise volume is difficult to ascertain. These transactions are not publicly
reported, and investment banks are secretive about their revenue sources. Yet in off-the-record
conversations, private client services bankers at several of the leading players, as well the smaller
ones, suggest that the volume is extremely high, perhaps on the order of $100 billion a year or
My sense is that few are using this strategy.
96

The key difference is that dealers can use “dynamic” hedging to hedge these securities, but not ones needed to
avoid Section 1260. For a discussion, see Part III.B.2, infra.
97

For example, assume the hedged asset is worth $100; the right to put the asset for $95 is worth $10; the right to
buy the asset for $120 is also worth $10; and the right to buy the asset for $115 is worth $13. In return for the put,
the taxpayer will give the dealer – not a call at $120 (worth $10) but a call at $115 (worth $13). The dealer thus
receives an extra $3 of value, but in a form the client privately values at less than $3. Dealers value this exposure
at $3, though, because they can convert it to cash through dynamic hedging, a process explained in Part III.B.2.
98

99

See supra note 46.

Theoretically, the margin rules could keep the taxpayer from extracting more than 50% of the hedged asset’s
value in cash. This regime, which dates from the 1930’s, keeps investors from borrowing more than 50% of their
securities’ value in certain circumstances. The theory is that too much margin borrowing can cause markets to
crash, as investors sell in a falling market to pay their lenders. But this regime does not apply if the loan is not a
“purpose” loan (i.e., to buy margin securities). Taxpayers also use prepaid forwards to avoid this regime.
Technically, the payment they receive represents sale proceeds, rather than a loan, and so the margin rules are
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more.
Positions worth more than $60 million can be too large for securities dealers.100 An
alternative is to hedge in the public market. The taxpayer in effect borrows money from public
investors and repays an amount based on the hedged asset’s value. The effect is to transfer most
of the hedged asset’s return. Public investors usually bear full risk of loss in the underlying stock,
while receiving only a portion of the opportunity for gain (i.e., so the taxpayer keeps enough to
avoid a constructive sale).101 But this hedge is harder for individuals than corporations. Under
the securities laws, it is not feasible for individuals to issue securities to the public.102 Instead, an
intermediary is needed. The intermediary buys the hedging security from the taxpayer in a private
transaction, and then issues an identical security to public investors. Investment banks served this
function in early transactions but a friction, the regulatory capital regime for securities dealers, has
slowed this practice.103 Instead, trusts are formed for this purpose. But frictions burden this

thought not to apply. For a discussion, see Appendix A.
100

The dealer may be unable to hedge its own exposure on such a large transaction. For instance, a short squeeze
becomes a greater concern.
101

For example, assume the hedged stock is currently worth $100 per share. The taxpayer issues a security that
pays, in three years, an amount of stock (e.g., between .8 shares and one share) that varies with the stock price in
three years. If the price declines below $100, one share is delivered. The effect is to transfer the full risk of loss to
the public investor. For instance, if the price falls to $10, the taxpayer can settle the public obligation for only $10.
If the underlying stock price rises, less than one share is delivered. The effect is for the taxpayer to keep some
opportunity for gain (i.e., enough to avoid a constructive sale), while transferring the rest to the public. Since
public investors receive less than all the opportunity for gain, they are compensated with a periodic payment that is
higher than the dividend on the underlying stock. For a discussion of these securities, see Schizer, supra note 7.
102

While it is not technically illegal for an individual to serve as a registrant under the securities laws, expert
practitioners report that, to their knowledge, no individual has ever done so. “It would be unheard of,” reported
Daniel Budofsky, a partner at Davis Polk & Wardwell.
103

In these so-called “rent the balance sheet” deals, the individual would issue a security, such as the one described
above in footnote 101, through the investment bank, using it’s ability to register securities under the securities
laws. The regulatory capital treatment is unfavorable, though. The dealer is “charged” for the public security (i.e.,
the public security is treated as a liability under the regulatory capital regime). But the private security obtained
from the client is not “credited” (i.e., the dealer’s supply of regulatory capital is not increased through holding this
asset) because of the asset’s illiquidity. Thus, by entering into these deals, dealers lose the ability to conduct other
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variation as well. The trust may have to be registered as an investment company,104 and large fees
must be paid to organize and administer it.105 As a result, although a significant volume of these
transactions are done (approximately $429 million in 1999), they are often abandoned for private
transactions (including collars and forwards with securities dealers). As Appendix C shows, of
twenty trust transactions filed with the SEC in 1999, only five were finalized.
Finally, public corporations sometimes have appreciated stock in other public
corporations. Tax deferral is especially appealing because the federal corporate tax rate is high
(i.e., 35% instead of the 20% long-term capital gains rate for individuals). Unlike individuals,
who must interpose a trust, corporations can easily hedge by issuing public securities. In 1999,
approximately five billion dollars of these securities were issued.106 Fees to financial and legal
advisors usually will be higher than if the underlying stock were sold (e.g., a three percent fee to
the investment bank). While investors theoretically could demand a premium for such complex
securities, legal frictions have reduced the need for one by creating a loyal pool of buyers:
Insurance companies and pension funds use these securities to circumvent state law limits on the
amount of equity they can hold. These regimes often (naively) treat these securities as debt, even
though the return closely tracks the underlying equity.
business. Once this costs is factored into the fee, the transaction ceases to be attractive. For a discussion of the
regulatory capital regime, see supra note 54.
104

See, e.g., DECS Trust V, Aug. 9, 19999 (describing status as nondiversified under Investment Company Act).
Compare Targets Trust IV, Sept. 29, 1999, at 31 (indicating that trust need not register under Investment
Company Act).
105

For instance, in a $95 million offering, approximately $600,000 of up-front expenses were incurred to organize
and administer the trust, including fees to the administrator, custodian, paying agent, and to each of three trustees,
and further annual payments were projected. See DECS Trust V, Aug 9, 1999, at 30.
106

A list of 1999 transactions is included in Appendix A. Their economic terms often are like those described in
footnote 101, at least in the case of so-called “DECS.” In the PHONES structure, in contrast, the taxpayer in effect
sells a thirty-year at-the-money call option. For a description of the “DECS” and “PHONES” structures, see
Schizer, supra note 7.
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Although hedging by corporations has been common, a change in the accounting rules has
introduced an important new friction. Since July 1, 2000, FASB 133 has required corporations to
mark derivatives to market, including these hedging securities.107 This mark-to-market rule does
not apply, though, to the underlying stock being hedged. Thus, if the hedged asset appreciates by
50%, this gain is not reflected in earnings, but the corresponding loss on the derivative would
be.108 This prospect of artificially volatile earnings has discouraged some corporations from
hedging.109 Yet it is too soon to assess this friction’s influence. For some firms, accounting
earnings are less important than cash flow or volume of customers.110 If earnings are important,
firms may respond by issuing two figures: one following FASB 133, and the other correcting for
it (e.g., by marking the hedged asset to market as well).111
C. Normative Implications
The main purpose of these case studies is positive, rather than normative: to describe
differences in frictions affecting two similar provisions, rather than to assess definitively whether
either is good policy. Others have outlined normative issues raised by Section 1259, and so a
107

Mark-to-market accounting would not apply if so-called “hedge” accounting applied. Yet in many cases, hedge
accounting reportedly would be unavailable. See generally Price Waterhouse Coopers, A Guide to Accounting for
Derivative Instruments and Hedging Activities (1998).
108

For instance, the stock might appreciate from $100 to $150, but this gain would not be reflected in earnings until
the stock is sold. On the derivative, the corporation will have lost only, say, $30 (since the first 20% of
appreciation is retained). Yet even though the corporation has a net profit of $20, FASB 133 – in focusing only on
the derivative loss – will reduce earnings by $30.
109

Volatility is introduced because FASB 133 also can increase earnings (e.g., if the stock price declines, triggering
unreported losses matched by reported gains on the derivative). Whereas risk neutral corporate managers could be
indifferent to this volatility, given the similar probabilities of increases and decreases, managers reportedly have
not reacted in this way.
110

Thus, cable companies have continued to engage in these transactions, as they are usually judged by the number
of subscribers.
111

Others are discussing issuance of hedging securities through special purpose vehicles whose earnings would not
be consolidated with the rest of the issuer’s earnings.
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detailed exploration is not attempted here.112 Yet the insights here do have normative
implications. In general, a transactional reform that actually stops the targeted planning is better
than one that merely induces a more wasteful variation. Application of this idea to the case
studies depends on one’s premises, though, as well as on empirical issues that warrant further
research.
1. Is Risk More than a Friction?
One premise, as to which there is disagreement, is whether taxpayers who bear risk
deserve a different tax treatment than those who do not. If risk is normatively significant in this
way, short sales against the box should be treated differently from collars and other partial return
hedges. Under this line of reasoning, a collar is not a method of avoidance, but a different
transaction for which tax deferral is justified. The theory is that in a realization-based system, as
long as taxpayers retain enough risk, they have not made a sale and thus should not be taxed.
This reasoning implicitly judges a rule by its consistency with our system’s formal logic, especially
the realization rule. The view is popular among tax practitioners, a reality that helps explain why
Section 1259 permits collars.
However, this focus on risk neglects the tax system’s underlying goal: to raise revenue
equitably and efficiently. As Professor Shaviro has emphasized, all else being equal, tax liabilities
should be based on the level of a taxpayer’s income or consumption – not on the level of risk she
takes.113 For reasons of administrability, our system traditionally has tested enrichment only when

112

See Deborah H. Schenk, Taxation of Equity Derivatives: A Partial Integration Proposal, 50 Tax L. Rev. 571
(1995); Deborah L. Paul, Another Uneasy Compromise: The Treatment of Hedging in a Realization Income Tax, 3
Fla. Tax. Rev. 1 (1996); David A. Weisbach, Should a Short Sale Against the Box Be a Realization Event? 50 Nat.
Tax J. 495 (1997).
113

See Shaviro, supra note 36.
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an asset is sold, and so risk becomes a part of the inquiry – but only to make the system more
administrable, not because risk itself is normatively significant. Once we depart from the
realization rule for hedging, there is no obvious reason to distinguish between partial and total
return hedges, assuming administrability burdens are similar. Thus, the balance of this Part
analyzes retained risk as a friction, instead of as an independent justification for tax deferral.
Those who do not accept this premise, though, would assess Section 1259 more favorably.
2. Cost-Benefit Analysis
More fundamentally, a threshold question, beyond this Article’s scope, is whether
investment returns should be taxed at all – or, at least, whether the rate should be lower. Under a
consumption tax, such returns generally would not be taxed. Difficulties with taxing capital,
illustrated anecdotally here, reinforce the case for a consumption tax. On the other hand,
assuming the same revenue must be raised, taxes on labor would rise. This would cause other
distortions and avoidance, for instance, as owners of businesses claim lower salaries and higher
investment returns. Since wealthy taxpayers have more investments, their share of the tax burden
could decline. While there are strong arguments on either side of this longstanding debate, the
question for our purposes is easier. If the tax burden on investments should be lower, this goal
should be implemented directly, through rate reductions or changes in the tax base, not through
wasteful taxpayer self help.
On the other hand, if the goal is to maintain or increase the tax on investments – a core
assumption of this Article, as noted above – a contribution of Section 1259 is to persuade wouldbe-hedgers to make taxable sales (i.e., because, in some cases, the need to retain risk is a
sufficiently strong friction) . These sales can advance vertical equity in raising the tax burden on
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wealthy investors.114 Since sales are cheaper than hedges, efficiency is enhanced as taxpayers
forgo wasteful hedging costs.115 Revenue raised in this way eliminates the need for other taxes,
which themselves would produce waste. While empirical research on the magnitude of these
benefits is needed, it is likely that many investors are induced to sell, especially positions worth
less than $1 million. Indeed, in three bull market years after Section 1259 was enacted, the volume
of short sales against the box probably would have grown dramatically if not for the reform.
Instead, individuals realized $424.3 billion of net capital gain in 1998.116 Robust receipts in later
years have contributed to the current budget surplus. Although some of this taxable gain stems
from actively-managed mutual funds, a significant amount presumably comes from taxpayers who
can no longer hedge.117
As noted above, Section 1259 also offers symbolic benefits. Average taxpayers may be
more inclined to pay tax voluntarily if they believe a wealthy taxpayer cannot avoid tax through a
short sale against the box. While the culture of compliance is worth protecting, Section 1259’s
contribution is hard to assess. An important question is whether average taxpayers know that
wealthy taxpayers can still hedge without paying tax. While they probably do not know now, they

114

It is assumed here that the rate structure and other features of the tax system do not already attain the desired
distribution of tax burdens.
115

Nor are these sellers “locked in” to investments they would not keep in the absence of taxes (although, if they
were hedging, they also would not be “locked in”).
116

117

Therese Cruciano, Individual Income Tax Returns, Preliminary Data, 1998, available on www.irs.gov.

The revenue estimate for Section 1259 is surprisingly modest: $ 367 million in 1998; $ 121 million in 1999; $
68 million in 2000; $ 73 million in 2001; $ 79 million 2001; $85 million in 2003; $ 91 million in 2004; $ 98
million in 2005; $ 105 million in 2006; $ 112 million in 2007. The total thus was $ 708 million in first five years
an $ 1,199 million in the first ten. See Jt. Comm. Taxation, Comparison of the Estimated Effects of the Revenue
Provisions of H.R. 2014 as Passed by the House and Senate. This estimate may not have assumed a continuation of
the bull market through the beginning of 2000. In any event, revenue estimates are often unreliable, at least in
forecasting the effect of a single provision. See Michael J. Graetz, Paint-By-Numbers Tax Lawmaking, 95 Colum.
L. Rev. 609, 670 (1995).
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may learn eventually, and so the symbolic benefits would not last.
Balanced against these benefits are significant costs. In addition to imposing new
administrative and compliance costs, Section 1259 probably also has intensified lock-in, as some
would-be-hedgers choose to keep their investment unhedged. The size of this effect warrants
further study. As demonstrated here, moreover, Section 1259 has induced many taxpayers to
hedge in a more elaborate and wasteful way. The volume of hedging among wealthy individuals
and public corporations is quite high. Vertical equity concerns also arise because wealthiest
taxpayers are least affected by the rule.118 Nor could the Treasury stop this avoidance without
further legislation, a politically difficult step.119
Ultimately, the case for Section 1259 turns on the empirical magnitude of these competing
effects. My guess is the balance is close but favorable. Yet a definitive conclusion is not possible
without further empirical research. The contribution of this Article is to show that avoidance has
been relatively easy for wealthy taxpayers, and to offer an explanation that can be generalized:
There is no discontinuous friction shoring up this narrow rule, as there is for the equally narrow
rule, Section 1260, discussed in Part III.
3. Alternatives to Section 1259
It is worth noting, though, that a broader rule would block far more hedging. For
instance, the test might be – not whether the hedge “substantially eliminates,” but whether it
118

There may be an efficiency reason to favor wealthy taxpayers. In deciding whether it is efficient to tax hedging,
we must see how would-be-hedgers will respond to the tax. If wealthy taxpayers are more likely to keep the asset
unhedged, instead of selling, we might as well let them hedge. No revenue is lost, and social waste from lock-in is
avoided. Nevertheless, I suspect that many wealthy taxpayers would sell if they could not hedge. In my experience,
taxpayers with positions large enough to hedge under Section 1259 often feel quite undiversified. Further
empirical work on this question is needed, though.
119

While regulatory authority could be used to require a somewhat larger band of retained exposure (e.g., 30%
instead of 20%), further broadening of the rule – for instance, to use the “substantial diminution“ test discussed
below -- would require legislation.
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“substantially diminishes” – risk of loss and opportunity for gain. This formulation, borrowed
from the straddle rules,120 is much harder to avoid, and my guess is few would try.121 Even so, a
broader rule could intensify lock-in, as would-be-hedgers choose to hold the asset unhedged
instead of selling. In addition, this straddle-type rule could undermine good transactions. For
instance, signing a contract to be acquired probably satisfies the substantial diminution test, even
if the contract is subject to significant closing conditions (and perhaps even if nonrecognition
treatment would apply when the acquisition is consummated). Likewise, we may not want very
short-term hedges to trigger tax. If appetite for them is elastic, taxing them will simply terminate
the practice without inducing realizations. Yet exceptions can be offered to avert such
overbreadth, and the tax bar will help with this process. Indeed, when Section 1259 was
proposed, exceptions were added for certain acquisitions of a business122 and for certain short-

120

See Section 1092(c)(1) (“The term ‘straddle’ means offsetting positions with respect to personal property.”);
Section 1092(c)(2)(A) (“A taxpayer holds offsetting positions with respect to personal property if there is a
substantial diminution of the taxpayer’s risk of loss from holding any position with respect to personal property by
reason of his holding 1 or more other positions with respect to personal property (whether or not of the same
kind).”). The straddle rules were passed to deal with a somewhat different transaction. If a taxpayer has offsetting
positions (e.g., contracts to buy and sell silver), the realization rule would allow her to generate an artificial timing
benefit by closing out the loss on December 31 (and thus deducting the loss this year) while closing out the gain on
January 1 (and deferring the taxable gain until next year). In response, the straddle rules defer the loss until the
offsetting gain is recognized. In general, the rules apply whenever one position “substantially diminishes” risk of
loss in another. This test would apply even when the taxpayer retains considerable exposure. Assume the
appreciated asset is worth $100. To avoid the rule, the taxpayer no longer would use a put at $90 and a call at
$110. Instead, the put might be at $50, and the call at $200. Given the breadth of the “substantial diminution”
test, it is not clear that a 50-200 spread is sufficient. In fact, in my experience major law firms are generally
unwilling to opine about how much exposure must be retained to avoid “substantial diminution” when the question
arises under the straddle rules. One of the few points on which there is certainty is that diversification alone does
not trigger this test. See Conf. Rep. on P.L. 97-34, reprinted in CCH Standard Federal Tax Reporter, at 55,081.
In contrast, opinions about “substantial elimination” under Section 1259 are commonplace.
121

Professor Schenk has offered another alternative that is harder to avoid than Section 1259. Her proposal is
somewhat broader in scope, and narrower in effect. Gain recognition is triggered merely by eliminating risk of
loss, even if opportunity for gain is retained. Thus, if a taxpayer has a basis of $0 in an asset worth $100, purchase
of a put with a $40 exercise price would trigger gain. Yet the amount of gain recognized is based, not on the
hedged asset’s fair market value, but on the amount of gain that is protected from loss (e.g., $40 instead of $100).
122

The New York State Bar Association raised this issue, see NYSBA supra note 87, and the Treasury responded
with Section 1259(c)(2). For a discussion of issues presented by this exception, see Schizer, supra note 83, at 349.
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term hedges.123 Other refinements would also be needed, but this topic is too extensive to be
addressed here.
In any event, a broad rule was considered politically unattainable by reformers, and my
sense is they were correct. Could the political capital devoted to Section 1259 have yielded a
different reform with a more favorable balance sheet? This question is too far-reaching to be
explored here, but one point should be noted. The high-profile hedging transactions that
prompted Section 1259 were exploiting two tax rules: not just the realization rule, but also the
step up in basis at death of Section 1014. It is possible that targeting the latter rule, which is
widely acknowledged as a policy monstrosity,124 would have made better use of the political
opportunity created by the media’s focus on hedging. For instance, the basis step-up could have
been revoked for any property that was hedged (e.g., under a broad “substantial diminution”
standard) within three years of the taxpayer’s death.125 Of course, such a proposal raises many
issues (e.g., the administrability of a carryover basis rule or of taxing gains at death, interaction
with the estate tax, the possibility of worsening lock-in, etc.), but a comprehensive analysis is

123

In response to a lobbying effort by the securities industry, the government added the short term hedging
exception of Section 1259(c)(3). As proposed by the government, the original short-term exception was too broad.
After the New York State Bar Association flagged this problem, see NYSBA supra note 87, the government
narrowed the exception. See Schizer, supra note 83, at 348-49. If Section 1259 is modified to adopt the
“substantial diminution” test recommended here, there will be more interest in using the short-term exception as a
long-term strategy. Hence, more restrictions should be placed on it — for instance, the asset should not be hedged
than more than a minimum total number of days in any taxable year (e.g., 90, as opposed to the 300 permitted
under current law).
124

See, e.g., Stanley Surrey & Jerome Kurtz, Reform of Death and Gift Taxes: The 1969 Treasury Proposals, the
Criticisms, and a Rebuttal, 70 Colum. L. Rev. 1365, 1381 (calling step-up in basis at death the “most serious
defect in our federal tax structure”).

125

Section 1259 narrows Section 1014 in a much more limited way. The reform revokes the basis step-up for
property subject to constructive sales that are not closed within a minimum amount of time after the date of
enactment.
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beyond this Article’s scope.126

III. CONSTRUCTIVE OWNERSHIP: WHEN FRICTIONS ARE STRONG
Two years after Section 1259 was enacted, Congress added Section 1260. Although the
latter aims at a different planning opportunity, the bill had the same sponsor in the House of
Representatives, Barbara Kennelly of Connecticut, and borrowed liberally from Section 1259’s
statutory language.127 Yet the common method of avoiding Section 1259 – a derivative with a
modified economic return – is not viable for Section 1260. This difference, which derives from
frictions, was not anticipated by government officials who crafted the reform. Since derivatives
cannot be used to avoid Section 1260, taxpayers have turned to other methods of avoidance
involving insurance and offshore corporations. Yet these strategies have also been impeded by
frictions, as well as by other tax rules. Unlike avoidance strategies for Section 1259, moreover,
these strategies probably could be shut down through regulations (or a notice that regulations will
be written with a retroactive effective date). After a description of the targeted transaction in
Section A, Section B describes avoidance strategies for Section 1260, and frictions that
undermine their appeal. Section C briefly considers normative implications.
A. Targeted Planning
In cutting the long-term capital gains rate from 28% to 20% in 1997, Congress reduced
the attractiveness of investment strategies that involve frequent trading, and thus do not generate
this tax-preferred return. Most hedge funds128 use such strategies to earn impressive pretax
returns. As partnerships for tax purposes, though, they pass their profits through to investors as
short-term capital gain, taxable in the current year. In response, investment bankers and their tax
126

For an insightful discussion of implementation issues associated with taxing gains at death, see Lawrence
Zelenak, Taxing Gains at Death, 46 Vand. L. Rev. 361 (1993).
127

After Congresswoman Kennelly left the House for an unsuccessful gubernatorial bid in Connecticut,
Representative Neal of Massachusetts became the chief sponsor of the bill.
128

For a description of hedge funds, see supra note 9.
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advisors developed a way to convert these appealing pre-tax returns into deferred long-term
capital gains: a derivative, such as a forward contract or swap, whose return was based on the
hedge fund’s value. No tax was due until the derivative was settled, and gains were taxed at longterm rates if the taxpayer held the derivative for at least a year.129 When selling such a derivative
to a client, the investment bank would hedge its “short” derivative position by investing in the
hedge fund. In essence, then, the investment bank would become a partner in the fund, and would
use a derivative to transfer the economic return to clients.130
After the transaction attracted media attention,131 Congress responded (with lukewarm
support from the Treasury) by enacting the constructive ownership rule of Section 1260. Closely
based on Section 1259, Section 1260 applies to derivatives that simulate the return of a hedge
fund or other pass-through entity132 by offering the holder substantially all of the risk of loss and
opportunity for gain from the underlying asset.133 If this hauntingly familiar test is satisfied,
129

Unlike a partner in a partnership, who is treated as engaging in a pro rata share of all the partnership’s
transactions, the holder of a derivative is not deemed to engage in the underlying activity. Rather, the derivative is
simply taxed as a free-standing contract, and the holding period is the length of time before the contract is
terminated. See Section 1234A. While this analysis clearly holds for a forward contract, there is some
disagreement within the tax bar about whether a swap gives rise to ordinary income or capital gain at maturity.
Yet even for swaps, the law is clear that an unscheduled termination gives rise to capital treatment. See Lewis
Steinberg, Over-the-Counter Derivatives for High Net Worth Individuals, in Derivatives in Tax Planning (Frank
Fabrozzi ed. 1998).
130

The transaction had to be structured with care to ensure that the client was not deemed the tax owner of the
hedge fund interest held by the dealer. For instance, the derivative typically had to be settled in cash and the
investment bank typically was contractually barred from sharing fund data or consulting on voting issues with the
client. For a discussion, see New York State Bar Association Tax Section, Comments on H.R. 3170, reprinted in
98 TNT 136-38 (July 16, 1998). Not all advisors agreed that the transaction worked under prior law. Assuming it
did, the transaction would make no sense if the investment bank would suffer the same adverse consequences in
investing in the fund as the client. Yet because investment banks mark all their securities to market under Section
475, they suffer no adverse consequences, and thus can serve as tax accommodation parties: Gains from the hedge
fund are matched by mark-to-marked (ordinary) losses on the derivative. For a discussion, see Schizer, supra note
26.
131

See, e.g., E.S. Browning, Where There’s a Tax Cut, Wall Street Finds a Way, Wall St. J., Oct 21, 1997, at C1.

132

Other pass-through entities include RICS, REITS, S Corporations, passive foreign investment corporations, and
foreign personal holding companies. See Section 1260(c)(2).
133

The definition of a constructive ownership transaction is based on, and closely tracks, Section 1259’s definition
of a constructive sale (found in supra note 83). Under Section 1260(d)(1):
The taxpayer shall be treated as having entered into a constructive ownership transaction with respect to any
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certain long-term capital gain earned on settlement of the derivative is recharacterized as ordinary
income, and an interest charge is imposed to compensate the government for tax deferral.134
B. Frictions and Avoidance
Notwithstanding the similarity of the statutory formula, the result has been different. To
develop the contrast with Section 1259, this Section begins with the tax benefit from avoiding the
measure and then considers the strength, discontinuity, and position of relevant frictions.
1. Tax Benefit
Avoiding Section 1260 often yields less of a tax benefit than avoiding Section 1259, and
so taxpayers may not try as hard. Although each transaction offers deferral, and the possibility of
tax forgiveness if the taxpayer dies, deferral opportunities are greater in hedging appreciated
assets. For these, significant built-in gains are already present when the transaction begins. With
a derivative based on an investment fund, in contrast, only gains earned after the transaction
begins can be deferred. Even so, avoiding Section 1260 offers a benefit, in addition to deferral,
that does not arise from avoiding Section 1259: halving of the relevant tax rate (i.e., from 39.6%
to 20%).135
financial asset if the taxpayer –
(A) holds a long position under a notional principal contract with respect to the financial asset,
(B) enters into a forward or futures contract to acquire the financial asset,
(C) is the holder of a call option, and is the grantor of a put option, with respect to the financial asset and
such options have substantially equal strike prices and substantially contemporaneous maturity dates,
or
(D) to the extent provided in regulations prescribed by the Secretary, enters into one or more other
transactions (or acquires one or more positions) that have substantially the same effect as a
transaction described in any of the preceding subparagraphs.
134

Specifically, gain is recharacterized to the extent it exceeds “net underlying long term capital gain,” which
essentially is the long-term capital gain that would have been earned from investing in the underlying property. In
imposing the interest charge, Section 1260 assumes that the gain accrued ratably. See Section 1260(a) (“If the
taxpayer has gain from a constructive ownership transaction with respect to any financial asset and such gain
would (without regard to this section) be treated as a long-term capital gain (1) such gain shall be treated as
ordinary income to the extent that such gain exceeds the net underlying long-term capital gain . . .”); Section
1260(b) (imposing interest charge on recharacterized gain).
135

See Appendix D for a numerical example illustrating the tax benefit offered by Section 1260.
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In assessing the tax benefit of avoiding Section 1260, a caveat is important: These
benefits, deferral and reduction of the rate, are appealing only if the hedge fund appreciates. If
instead the fund has losses, deferring these deductions and converting them from short- to longterm would increase the tax burden. Even so, taxpayers can head off this adverse result by
settling the derivative before the termination date (e.g., before the end of the first tax year).136
Ultimately, then, the hedge fund derivative offers a tax reduction in the gain scenario that is not
offset by a corresponding tax increase in the loss scenario. Ex ante, this strategy is expected to
reduce the tax burden, but the expected benefit must be discounted for arising only if the fund
appreciates.
2. Derivatives With a Modified Return: Difficulty of Dynamic Hedging
Since Section 1260 uses essentially the same statutory standard as Section 1259, we might
expect a similar avoidance strategy: derivatives that offer most, but not all, of the fund’s return.
For a fund interest worth $100, for instance, the taxpayer might bear the full risk of loss below
$95 (e.g., by selling a put with a $95 exercise price), while enjoying opportunity for gain above
$115 (e.g., by purchasing a call with a $115 exercise price). In fact, these “partial return”
strategies reportedly are uncommon.
Although frictions ultimately account for the difference, legal disparities should be
considered first. Unlike Section 1259, Section 1260 does not have legislative history deeming the
rule inapplicable when the return on the derivative differs sufficiently from the return on the
underlying property.137 The statutes themselves are also different in their treatment of forward
136

If taxpayers could not accelerate losses in this way, the value of the hedge fund transaction, ex ante, would be
diminished considerably. Cf. Joseph Bankman & Thomas Griffith, Is the Debate Between an Income and a
Consumption Tax a Debate About Risk? Does it Matter?, 47 Tax L. Rev. 377, 396-400 (1992) (arguing that,
under assumed conditions, tax burden on return to risk is irrelevant because taxpayers will offset tax by increasing
riskiness of the portfolio). If the fund depreciates, the dealer will be willing to settle the derivative early. Were the
dealer governed by the same tax rule as the customer, early settlement would accelerate – not just the customer’s
losses – but also the dealer’s gain. The dealer’s tax bill would increase by the same amount the customer’s tax bill
declines, assuming the same rate applied. Yet the dealer is required to mark the derivative to market under Section
475. Thus, early termination has no effect on the dealer’s tax bill. For a discussion, see Schizer, supra note 26, at
1372.
137

For citations to this legislative history under Section 1259, see supra notes 83 and 88. No such references
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contracts. Indeed, Section 1260 covers any forward contract, even one that omits a portion of
the underlying fund’s economic return, and so such forwards are not a viable means of
avoidance.138 Nevertheless, the statute is more generous with options and equity swaps.139 If
these derivatives are used, the relevant statutory test is sufficiently similar to Section 1259 that
comparable avoidance strategies would pass legal muster for Section 1260.
The relative difficulty of avoiding Section 1260, then, derives not from the tax law itself,
but from frictions. These frictions affect the securities dealer counterparty. First, even the
transaction that prompted enactment of Section 1260, a derivative offering the entire fund return,
had an important strike against it. To hedge the derivative, the dealer would hold the fund
interest. But this illiquid position is treated unfavorably under regulatory capital rules for dealers.
Because the capital invested in the fund is deemed unavailable to meet other obligations, the
dealer may have to raise additional equity capital.140 This cost does not arise to the same extent
appear in the legislative history for Section 1260. See Comm. Rep. P.L. 106-170. The reason, I believe, is that the
bounds of this test were reasonably well understood, since the standard was consciously lifted from Section 1259.
138

See Section 1260(d)(4) (defining forward contract as “any contract to acquire in the future (or provide or receive
credit for the future value of) any financial asset”). In contrast, Section 1259 omits forward contracts in which the
amount of property delivered varies significantly with the value of the underlying property. See Section 1259(d)(1)
(defining forward contract as “a contract to deliver a substantially fixed amount of property (including cash) for a
substantially fixed price"). Section 1260 covers such variable-delivery forward contracts, but regulatory authority is
provided to exclude them. The Treasury has not yet used this authority.
139

With a pair of options, the regime is avoided as long as their exercise prices are not “substantially equal.” See
Section 1260(d)(1)(C) (regime is triggered by holding a call and selling a put, but only if “such options have
substantially equal strike prices and substantially contemporaneous maturity dates”). Similarly, Section 1260
clearly applies only to swaps offering the entire return (i.e., “substantially all” risk of loss and opportunity for gain)
of the hedge fund – but not to swaps offering only some of this return. See Section 1260(d)(3) (person has “long
position under notional principal contract,” and thus is covered by statute, if the person “has the right to be paid (or
receive credit for) all or substantially all of the investment yield (including appreciation) on such financial asset for
a specified period, and is obligated to reimburse (or provide credit for) all or substantially all of any decline in the
value of such asset”). The standard under Section 1259 is identical in all relevant respects. See Section 1259(d)(2)
(defining “offsetting notional principal contract” as “any agreement which includes a requirement to pay (or
provide credit for) all or substantially all of the investment yield (including appreciation) on such property for a
specified period, and a right to be reimbursed for (or receive credit for) all or substantially all of any decline in the
value of such property”).
140

Specifically, the derivative issued to the customer was treated as a liability, but the hedge fund held by the
dealer was not “credited” in full as regulatory capital. As a result, the transaction drained the dealer’s supply of
regulatory capital for other activities. For a discussion of this problem, see supra note 54.
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for derivatives based on publicly-traded assets, such as those used to avoid Section 1259, because
these are hedged with liquid positions in the public market.
Once the derivative must convey less than all of the hedge fund’s economic return – a
requirement for avoiding Section 1260 – the dealer faces an additional problem. A perfect hedge
of the derivative is not available. For instance, assume the investment bank is asked to sell a call
for $115 and buy a put for $95. If the fund appreciates from $100 to $115 this profit goes to the
dealer. Yet if the price declines from $100 to $95, the dealer cannot pass this loss on to the client
(i.e., through the put).
Why is it important for securities dealers to hedge? Their business is to provide a service
(i.e., derivatives to those who want them), not to place bets on hedge funds. It is not usually
dealers, but specially-trained and monitored proprietary traders, that invest an investment bank’s
own capital. Dealer subsidiaries must avoid unhedged risk because their creditworthiness is
essential to their business. No one would buy derivatives from an entity with poor credit, because
of uncertainty about whether the dealer could honor the contract. In a world of perfect
information, dealers could take intelligent unhedged risks, such as bets that are priced favorably
because a client is sharing a tax benefit with the dealer. Yet it would be difficult for prospective
customers of a dealer (or, for that matter, shareholders) to distinguish such sensible bets from less
sensible ones. Nor can employees be trusted to take only well compensated risks, since pay is tied
to volume of business. In response, major investment banks generally have very strict riskmanagement policies for derivatives dealers. These policies render it quite difficult for dealers to
supply the derivative needed to avoid Section 1260. Usually, no mismatch is permitted between
derivative and fund returns. Put another way, when it is the dealer that must bear unhedged risk,
as opposed to the investor (i.e., when avoiding Section 1259), risk becomes a strong
discontinuous friction.
Given this difficulty, why are dealers able to supply derivatives for avoidance of Section
1259? After all, a dealer that offers customers a collar on one share cannot perfectly hedge by
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selling one share short, since the economic returns do not match perfectly.141 The key difference
is that for Section 1259, but not Section 1260, the relevant derivative is based on a publicly traded
asset. As a result, dealers can use hedging strategies that rely on the correlation of underlying
stock prices with the derivative’s value. To see such correlation, assume a share of stock is worth
ten dollars, and someone has the right to buy the stock for $100. Since this call option would not
be used unless the stock price rises above $100, a one dollar increase in the stock price, from ten
to eleven dollars, will not generate a full dollar of appreciation in the option. Instead, the option
might appreciate by only a penny (reflecting the marginally increased likelihood that the stock
price will reach $100).
This sensitivity of a derivative to changes in the underlying stock’s value, known as
“delta,” is used by dealers in so-called “dynamic” hedging.142 For instance, assume a collar leaves
a dealer exposed to risk of loss below $95 and opportunity for gain above $115 on 1000 shares of
a publicly traded stock. For every dollar change in the underlying’s value, this collar’s value will
change by an observable number of cents, which will be less than a dollar. The reason for this
divergence is that the collar does not cover the full range of stock returns. There is a gap between
$95 and $115. As a result, since the collar is based on 1000 shares, the dealer would not hedge
by shorting a full 1000 shares, but an amount fewer than 1000 shares. If a $1 change in the asset
price induces an 80 cent change in the collar’s value, the dealer’s offsetting short would be 80%
as large (e.g., shorting 800 shares to hedge a collar on 1000 shares).143 Delta will vary as the
141

Assume the dealer sells a $95 put and buys a $115 call, giving the dealer most, but not all, of the return from
owning the stock: risk of loss below $95, and opportunity for gain above $115. A short sale of a single share does
not offer complete protection. The problem is that the dealer will lose $15 on the short sale as the stock rises from
$100 to $115, but will not make this money back on the collar (i.e., because opportunity for gain on the call begins
at $115).
142

See generally, Nassim Taleb, Dynamic Hedging: Managing Vanilla and Exotic Options (1997); P.J. Hunt & J.E.
Kennedy, Financial Derivatives in Theory and Practice (2000).
143

If delta is .8, then as the price of the underlying falls from $100 to $99, the dealer would lose 80 cents per share
on the collar (because the reduced likelihood of profiting from the $115 call the dealer has purchased, and the
increased likelihood of having loss on the $95 put the dealer has sold). Total loss on the collar would be $800 (i.e.,
.80 * 1000 shares). To make up for this loss, the dealer must short 800 shares, thereby earning $1 per share, or
$800.
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underlying stock price changes, reflecting different probabilities that the derivative will yield a
profit or loss.144 Thus, the dealer must constantly monitor delta and make corresponding
adjustments in the size of the hedge.
For two reasons, then, dynamic hedging is feasible only for publicly traded assets, and not
for hedge fund positions. First, computation of delta requires data about the relationship between
derivatives and the underlying, and such a rich supply of data is available only for a publicly traded
asset.145 Second, constant adjustments in the size of the hedge are feasible only in an extremely
liquid market -- and certainly not with a hedge fund, which might allow redemptions only four
times a year.146
3. Responses
Notwithstanding these frictions, some transactions are still possible. Six alternatives
warrant discussion. The first three attempt to salvage the derivative with a modified return. The
fourth still uses a derivative, but moves it offshore instead of changing the economic return.
144

For instance, if the stock price is $100, the stock price must climb to $115 before the dealer will begin to profit
from the call it owns with a $115 exercise price. An increase from $100 to $101 thus will not induce a full $1 of
appreciation on the option, given the relatively low probability that the price will attain the $115 level. On the
other hand, a price increase from $215 to $216 will have a much greater influence on the $115 call option’s value,
since the option-holder can collect this gain by exercising the option. Hence, the option is likely to appreciate by
almost a full dollar.
145

If the dealer knew the details of the fund’s trading strategy, the dealer could use this information to hedge. Yet
funds are secretive about their trading strategies. This trade secret justifies high management fees. An additional
friction for this transaction, which also applied to the pre-1260 variety, is that some hedge funds do not allow a
securities dealer to invest. They do not want the dealer to gain enough access and information to duplicate the
trading strategy.
146

Just as Section 1260 is effective in blocking hedge fund derivatives, it also is effective in blocking derivatives
based on mutual funds. These are also covered by Section 1260. There was less demand for such transactions,
though. In part, many mutual fund investors are not wealthy enough to engage in over-the-counter derivatives
transactions, given transaction costs and the wealth requirements of the commodities laws. In any event, Section
1260 is effective because mutual fund redemptions (e.g., once a day) generally are not frequent enough to support
dynamic hedging. However, this constraint does not apply to exchange-traded funds, which are a new presence in
the capital markets. For now, these funds are based on indices, and so they do not pass through enough capital
gain to justify substituting a derivative. Yet in the coming years, actively-managed funds will start to be traded on
exchanges. See Danny Hakim, Market Place: Two Reports See Exchange-Traded Funds as a Logical Extension for
Mutual Fund Companies, Wall St. J., July 27, 200, at C10 (most exchange-traded funds provide a set pool of
stocks, but introduction of actively managed funds is expected in the next one or two years). At that point, we may
see transactions designed to avoid Section 1260. The more general point is that frictions change over time.
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Anecdotal evidence suggests that these four are relatively rare. Considerably more common are
the last two, which do not use derivatives at all: purchase of an insurance contract or of stock in
an offshore insurance company.
a. Responses Involving Derivatives
First, while unhedged risk of loss is unacceptable to dealers,147 unhedged opportunity for
gain is less of a concern. For example, assume a dealer purchases a hedge fund interest for $100.
The dealer might purchase a $100 put from a client and sell a $120 call. The dealer’s net
exposure would be to profit from appreciation between $100 and $120. Yet although dealers will
not object to this exposure, they reportedly will not pay for it, at least at major investment banks.
The reason, as discussed above, is that dealers are experts at supplying liquidity, not making
investments. They also avoid holding risky assets to remain creditworthy, a necessary quality in a
business of undertaking obligations. As a result, clients reportedly are charged for the full
opportunity for gain, without a discount for the $20 of appreciation kept by the dealer. For
example, assume a direct investment in the fund would cost $100. For the derivative, the client
would pay approximately $103 (i.e., the price of the hedge fund plus a 3% fee). While the tax
treatment is better, no pretax profit is earned until the underlying fund appreciates by 20%. This
deal makes sense only if a very high pretax return (and thus a high tax bill) is expected on the
fund. Anecdotal evidence suggests this transaction is rare. Eventually, dealers may start paying
for this 20% of retained exposure, since this bet clearly has positive value. For instance, less well
known investment banks might do so to attract new business, although these dealers would have
to consider the effect of a risky portfolio on their creditworthiness. If this transaction becomes
common, it would illustrate the point that frictions can prove unstable. For now, my research
suggests this friction remains effective.
147

For instance, an investment bank would bear significant risk of loss in selling an at-the-money call option while
holding the underlying fund. If the hedge fund declined by more than the premium the bank had received, the
bank would lose money on the deal. One investment bank reportedly offered this structure before Section 1260 was
enacted (apparently because the tax analysis under common law was stronger, i.e., that the client did not own the
underlying fund interest). Yet the investment bank suffered significant losses, and no longer offers this structure.
Likewise, several investment bankers and advisors mentioned this precedent in explaining that their institution
could not be exposed to risk of loss.

Schizer, Frictions as a Constraint on Tax Planning

Page 51

Instead of paying for this exposure, dealers have looked for ways of giving this return to
the client. For example, the client could receive no payment as the fund appreciates 20%, while
receiving double credit for the next 20%. As the fund appreciates from $120 to $121, the client
receives – not one – but two dollars. When the fund reaches $140, the client claims $40 of
appreciation (i.e., two dollars for each dollar of appreciation between $120 and $140). As long as
the fund appreciates to $140, the client benefits from all appreciation in the underlying fund,
sharing none with the dealer. Yet this “catch-up” structure weakens the tax argument. To avoid
Section 1260, the return on the derivative and underlying fund must diverge in a meaningful way.
In this transaction, a difference arises only if the fund’s maturity value is between $100 and $120
(and, to some extent, between $120 and $140). For some funds, the end value is reasonably likely
to be in this range. Yet for many funds, the likelihood is remote. As a result, although some
investment banks have considered offering this transaction, the volume reportedly is limited.
Since the dealer does not value the exposure between $100 and $120 and, for tax reasons,
the client should not take it, a third approach is to transfer this exposure to an unrelated third
party.148 The dealer would thus sell the right to this appreciation as a separate “stub” security.
After collecting payment for the stub, the dealer could reduce the price of the main derivative.
Nevertheless, several investment bankers describe this strategy as impractical. Since the dealer
will not tolerate unhedged exposure for any amount of time, the dealer cannot keep the stubs as
inventory, to be sold whenever a suitable customer is found. Rather, two unrelated customers
must appear simultaneously, and must want the same fund. In addition, if one customer wishes to
terminate the derivative prior to maturity (e.g., to claim tax losses), the other must be compelled
to do so because the dealer cannot hedge one without the other. The practical effect is the stub
must have an uncertain term, terminating whenever the main derivative terminates. This
requirement will reduce the price an investor would pay. Even if these problems could be solved
148

The two customers must be unrelated so the government cannot treat the two as one person and deem them,
jointly, to be subject to Section 1260. Notably, though, there is no explicit authority in Section 1260 to consider the
activities of related parties, as there is in Section 1259. The Treasury should use its regulatory authority to fill this
gap.
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– for instance, by forming a fund that regularly buys stubs – individual investment bankers may
not consider the task worth their time. Cultivating a stubs market would be a slow process with
an uncertain return. Investment bankers usually have a short time horizon. They want results in
time for their annual bonus. In this mobile market, bankers may leave the firm after a year or less.
In other words, agency costs are impeding an avoidance strategy. In addition, as with any
innovation, risks and expenses are borne by the innovator, for instance, in educating the market,
but rewards must be shared. If the stubs market catches on, others will sell them too, thereby
reducing the innovator’s expected profits.
Instead of changing the derivative’s economic return, taxpayers could hold the derivative
through an offshore corporation. As a result, the taxpayer no longer owns a derivative, at least
directly. Instead, she owns common stock in a corporation, an investment not explicitly covered
by Section 1260. Nor does Section 1260 apply to the corporation itself, as long as the entity is
not subject to U.S. tax (e.g., if based offshore without business effectively connected to the U.S.).
Foreign tax is not a concern if the corporation is in a tax haven. Nor are costs of setting up an
offshore vehicle prohibitive. Even so, this structure has two potential vulnerabilities. First, other
anti-abuse rules can impose adverse tax consequences on U.S. taxpayers who make passive
investments through offshore corporations, including the passive foreign investment company
(“PFIC”)149 and controlled foreign corporation (“CFC”)150 rules. While a comprehensive
examination of these regimes is beyond this Article’s scope, it should be noted that these regimes
complicate matters, but do not necessarily block the transaction.151 Rather, the real vulnerability is
caused by Section 1260 itself. In addition to covering a list of derivatives transactions, which
149

See Section 1291 et seq.

150

See Section 951 et seq.

151

For instance, if the entity is a PFIC, the taxpayer could make a so called qualified electing fund (“QEF”)
election. See Section 1295. The corporation thus is taxed on a pass-through basis. Because Section 1260 does not
trigger any tax consequences until the derivative is settled, there is no income to pass through to the taxpayer until
the derivative is settled. What if, a month before the derivative matures, the U.S. taxpayer sells her PFIC stock at a
gain? As an economic matter, a portion of this gain would derive from the derivative. However, this gain arguably
would not be recharacterized because Section 1260 has not been triggered yet.
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admittedly does not include this structure, Section 1260 also provides regulatory authority to
cover “transactions . . . having substantially the same effect” as the listed ones.152 The
government could easily shut down this structure through a notice that retroactive regulations will
cover it. Indeed, the possibility of this action is already a fairly effective deterrent. Volume
reportedly is modest.153
b. Responses Not Involving Derivatives
Section 1260 thus has been quite effective in blocking structures that use derivatives to
improve the tax treatment of hedge fund returns. To an extent, though, it is still possible to
improve the tax treatment of these returns – not through derivatives, but through insurance
contracts and offshore insurance companies.
Before describing these strategies, a broader point should be made. Avoidance is
avoidance, whether taxpayers are using derivatives, insurance, or something else. Either way, less
revenue is collected, social waste could increase, and the distribution of tax burdens could be
skewed. As we shall see, though, the volume of avoidance through insurance is constrained, to an
extent, by other frictions. More importantly, the Treasury already has regulatory authority to shut
these transactions down. Legislation, and the political challenges it entails, are not needed to
make Section 1260 more effective. As we have seen, the same cannot be said for Section 1259.
One strategy for securing tax-advantaged hedge fund returns is to buy a variable life
insurance policy or annuity offering one or more hedge funds as investment options.154 This is, of
152

Before Section 1260 was enacted, the New York State Bar Association suggested clarification that the
“substantially the same effect” catch-all covered this offshore structure. See New York State Bar Association Tax
Section, Comments on Constructive Ownership and H.R. 1703, reprinted in 1999 TNT 135-33 (1999). No
language or legislative history was added, presumably because the drafters already thought the point was clear. In
the interests of full disclosure, I was the principal author of the NYSBA report.
153

Taxpayers can strengthen their argument that retroactive regulations should not apply by differentiating the
economic return on their common stock from the economic return on the derivative. For instance, the offshore
corporation could hold other assets, such as mortgages. Yet addition of these other assets increases transaction
costs. In addition, the regulations might still apply, as long as the government undertakes to bifurcate or look
through the common stock.
154

In such a policy, the taxpayer would pay a fixed fee. The size of the death benefit or annuity payments would
depend upon performance of an asset the taxpayer designates from a range of options.
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course, an old planning strategy. Favorable treatment of life insurance and annuities is
longstanding, due to sympathy for bereaved life insurance beneficiaries, administrability problems
with taxing annuities and, no doubt, the political clout of insurance companies.155 These contracts
offer a way to avoid tax burdens on any number of investments (e.g., bonds, mutual funds, and
the like). Thus, these contracts can substitute for derivatives listed in Section 1260, to an extent,
by offering favorable timing consequences: deferral, or even forgiveness if the contract lasts until
death. As long as the tax system views the insurance company as the partner in the hedge fund,156
the taxpayer does not have current inclusions as a hedge fund partner. As with a derivative, tax is
deferred until payments are received.157 Life insurance proceeds, moreover, are never taxed if
received upon death of the insured,158 a result as favorable as the basis step-up for derivatives held
until death.159
Nevertheless, tax treatment is not as favorable as under pre-1260 rules for derivatives
because character of payments received before death is ordinary.160 Indeed, a hedge fund itself
yields better character, since some investment return will satisfy the long-term holding period. In
addition, life insurance and annuities present frictions of their own. Most importantly, favorable
tax treatment is available only if the taxpayer places a mortality bet. Otherwise, the contract will
not qualify as life insurance or an annuity for tax purposes. The extra cost or risk associated with
this bet is unattractive to some. These policies also can be subject to high excise taxes (e.g., one
155

See generally Marvin A. Chirelstein 29-36 (Rev. 8th ed. 1999) (discussing tax treatment of insurance and
annuities).
156

Like securities dealers, insurance companies are subject to mark-to-market accounting on assets in so-called
segregated accounts. As a result, the insurance company does not experience adverse timing consequences on its
offsetting positions.
157

On the tax treatment of annuities, see Section 72; see also Chirelstein, supra note 155, at 29-32.

158

See Section 101. Life insurance can offer the added benefit of avoiding estate tax if the policy is held in a way
that excludes it from the taxpayer’s estate.
159

This benefit may not be available for annuities, depending upon how they are structured. Annuities often cease
making payments upon the death of the annuitant.
160

See Section 72(a).
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percent of the premium).161 Insurance companies are reputed to charge higher fees than
investment banks, although further research on this point is warranted.162 For small insurance
companies, moreover, credit risk is a concern.
Notwithstanding these frictions and the unavailability of long-term capital gain, insurance
and annuity contracts are becoming an increasingly common method of securing tax-advantaged
hedge fund returns. To an extent, this phenomenon is part of a broader problem. Efforts to tax
most investments can be avoided, to an extent, if insurance and annuities are not also covered.
The extent of this avoidance depends on the frictions described above, and more research is
needed on this point. On the narrower question of hedge fund returns, though, Section 1260
arguably extends even to insurance and annuities. The Treasury has regulatory authority to cover
transactions having “substantially the same effect” as the enumerated ones. In my view, this
language is broad enough for regulations on annuities and insurance contracts that offer taxdeferred hedge fund returns, although the case is not free of doubt.163 While writing a regulation
could take time, the Treasury could stop the practice immediately with a brief notice that
regulations will be issued with a retroactive effective date.
Alternatively, instead of buying an insurance policy, taxpayers might invest in an offshore
insurance or reinsurance company whose assets are managed by a hedge fund manager – in effect,
a hedge fund that also sells insurance. Instead of a partnership, the fund is structured as a
corporation. Thus, investors are not liable every year for tax on the fund’s trading profits.
161

See Section 4374 (imposing 1% excise tax on premiums paid to foreign insurers).

162

Taxpayers will also have limited choices as to which hedge fund’s return will be reflected in their policy. The
tax analysis is stronger if the particular hedge fund’s return is available to all policy holders (since, under general
substance over form principles, the insurance company is more likely to be viewed as the hedge fund partner,
instead of the policy holder). Given the cost of making an investment in a particular fund generally available,
insurance companies are likely to offer only certain funds, but not others.
163

The counter-argument is that the effect is not “substantially the same” for two reasons. First, the economics of
the transaction are different because of mortality risk. Second, the tax result is different because the character here
is ordinary. While these arguments have some force, their persuasiveness depends on the scope of the regulations
(e.g., whether they exempt policies with substantial mortality risk) and, ultimately, on the degree of discretion the
Treasury is thought to have in writing regulations.
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Instead, investors pay no tax until they sell their fund interest. Long-term capital gain rates apply
to investments of more than one year. To keep the fund itself from paying U.S. (or other) income
tax, the fund is established in a tax haven (e.g., Bermuda). Such offshore “incorporated
pocketbooks” are an old abuse, targeted by several regimes. Most relevant are the PFIC rules of
1986, which generally apply to firms, such as hedge funds, that are engaged in investing and other
“passive” businesses.164 If the PFIC regime applies, there is no tax advantage over a domestic
partnership. Investor returns would be recharacterized as ordinary income, and an interest charge
would be imposed, as under Section 1260. The key here, though, is that the PFIC regime does
not apply to insurance companies, a statutory exception not yet elaborated by regulations.165
For the fund to qualify as an insurance company, frictions must be introduced. These will
deter some taxpayers. First, the fund must bear some mortality or casualty risk.166 Yet especially
because these risks are actuarially predictable, risk is likely to function here as a continuous
friction, as in Section 1259. Taxpayers will accept marginal increases, to a point, as the price of a
lower tax. Second, the fund’s ability to reinvest profits may be limited. The purpose of the fund’s

164

Other regimes include the controlled foreign corporation regime, see Section 951 et seq., the foreign personal
holding company regime, see Section 551 et seq., and the personal holding company regime, see Section 541 et
seq. But these rules generally apply only if the taxpayer owns more than a minimum percentage of the entity.
These rules thus can be avoided if taxpayers purchase, for instance, interests of less than 10%.
165

To be precise, foreign corporations qualify as PFICS if more than a minimum percentage of their income or
income-producing assets are passive. See Section 1297(a). Income from “the active conduct of an insurance
business” generally is deemed not to be passive. See Section 1297(b)(2) (“Exception as provided in regulations,
the term `passive income’ does not include any income . . . (B) derived in the active conduct of an insurance
business by a corporation which is predominantly engaged in an insurance business and which would be subject to
tax under subchapter L if it were a domestic corporation.”).
166

As noted above, the PFIC regime does not treat as passive “any income . . . derived in the active conduct of an
insurance business” if the corporation “is predominantly engaged in an insurance business” and would be subject
to tax under the Code’s special regime for insurance in subchapter L. See Section 1297(b)(2). Under regulations
implementing Subchapter L, the key factor is, in effect, whether the “primary and predominant” business of the
corporation is selling insurance and annuities. See Treas. Reg. 1.801-3(a)(1) (“The term `insurance company’
means a company whose primary and predominant business activity during the taxable year is issuing insurance or
annuity contracts or the reinsuring of risks underwritten by insurance companies. Thus, though its name, charter
powers, and subjection to state insurance laws are significant in determining the business which a company is
authorized and intends to carry on, it is the character of the business actually done in the taxable year which
determines whether a company is taxable as an insurance company under the Internal Revenue Code.”).
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investments supposedly is to fund insurance liabilities.167 If these reserves dwarf the liabilities, it is
not credible to claim that the fund is an insurance company. One solution is to sell more insurance
(although this means accepting more insurance risk). Instead, in some cases the fund may have to
return (taxable) cash to investors.168 Third, insurance regulations and credit rating agencies may
not allow some kinds of risky assets or trading strategies. But these constraints are not always
strict, for instance, if offshore regulators are eager to attract new insurers. Finally, offshore
insurance firms may incur a one percent excise tax on premiums, and also face other tax issues,
such as whether their insurance activities are effectively connected to the U.S., and thus subject to
U.S. tax.169
This transaction is becoming fairly common, although I do not know exactly how
common. Some of this volume reportedly arises because there are no regulations defining an
insurance company under the PFIC rules. In this void, taxpayers take aggressive positions that
minimize the effect of relevant frictions. For instance, some entities hedge or reinsure insurance
risks, so the investor’s economic return is based solely on the investment portfolio. If rigorous
regulatory requirements are imposed, many of these transactions will be stopped. This is an easy
step, mechanically, since the Treasury could issue a brief notice that retroactive regulations are
forthcoming. The ease of this course should not be overstated, though. The proper regulatory
standard presents difficult questions beyond this Article’s scope. To an extent, the PFIC regime’s
distinction between active and passive entities is murky when applied to financial intermediaries.
After all, a key business objective even of “real” insurance firms is to earn high investment returns,
167

The general principle is that reserves should be consistent with the reasonable needs of the insurance business.
See, e.g., Treas. Reg. 1.801-4 (a) (defining “life insurance reserves” as reserves based on actuarial predictions,
reserves designed to fund insurance liabilities, and reserves required by law).
168

Distributions or pro-rata redemptions would be treated as dividends taxable in full at ordinary rates. Certain
non-pro-rata redemptions would be taxed at capital gains rates, with a basis offset.
169

The excise tax is four percent of premiums paid on a policy of casualty insurance or an indemnity bond, and
generally one percent on all other premiums, including life insurance and reinsurance. See Section 4371. The
excise tax does not apply to an amount effectively connected with the conduct of a trade or business in the U.S.,
unless this amount is exempted from U.S. tax under a treaty. See Section 4374.
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which allow for reduced premiums and more customers. The purpose here is not to develop the
appropriate rule for offshore insurance companies or, for that matter, offshore investments in
general.
Rather, the key point is that stopping a particular tax-motivated use of derivatives – as
was achieved in Section 1260, but not in Section 1259 – is not the end of the job. Planners will
seek other opportunities. Two common ones, used in this context and others as well, are
insurance contracts and offshore vehicles. This dynamic illustrates a familiar limitation of narrow
transactional reforms. By itself, one will seldom be enough. On the other hand, a series of
targeted measures (e.g., one aimed at derivatives, another at offshore insurance companies, etc.)
sometimes can stop a popular planning objective such as tax advantaged hedge fund returns.
Similarly, adding one reform can be significant, if others already are on the books. For this
strategy to be effective, policymakers must know where the next hole in the dike will be – that is,
where frictions are weakest.
C. Normative Implications: Cost-Benefit Analysis
As noted above, the main purpose of the case studies is to highlight the effect of frictions,
rather than to judge the merits of each provision. Yet understanding frictions and avoidance
contributes to better normative judgments.
Of course, as with Section 1259, there is a threshold question, beyond this Article’s scope,
whether investment returns should be taxed and, if so, at what rate. Indeed, much ink has been
spilled about whether there ever should be a preferential rate for capital gains.170 Assuming there
should be, a further question is whether the preference should apply to hedge fund returns. The
answer depends in part on the rationale for the preference. For instance, the rationale might be to
discourage short-term transactions as socially wasteful. The theory might be that speculation is a
zero sum game from society’s perspective,171 or that short-term investors do less socially useful
170

For a summary of this literature, see Noel B. Cunningham & Deborah H. Schenk, The Case for a Capital Gains
Preference, 48 Tax L. Rev. 319 (1993).
171

Cf. Lynn Stout, Why the Law Hates Speculators: Regulation and Private Ordering in the Market for OTC
Derivatives, 48 Duke L.J. 701 (1999) (discussing whether speculation is a zero-sum game).

Schizer, Frictions as a Constraint on Tax Planning

Page 59

monitoring of management. Under these theories, the preference should not be extended. On the
other hand, hedge funds are sophisticated and often engage in useful market-equilibrating
arbitrage, and so concerns about speculation as a zero sum game are less persuasive. Moreover,
if the rationale for long-term treatment is to favor deferred consumption, the preference ought to
be extended because hedge fund investors generally reinvest their gains. As with Section 1259,
although arguments can be made on both sides, the question is easier for our purposes. The tax
burden on hedge fund returns can be reduced more straightforwardly without wasteful self help.172
On the other hand, if the objective is to maintain or increase the tax – which, again, is a
core assumption of this Article – Section 1260 makes two contributions. Like Section 1259, the
rule offers symbolic benefits. More than Section 1259, moreover, the rule actually stops the
targeted derivatives transaction. Taxpayers no longer have a tax reason to invest in hedge funds
through derivatives, instead of directly. Efficiency is enhanced because the higher costs of
derivatives are avoided (e.g., the investment bank’s 3% fee). Likewise, vertical equity is also
advanced as wealthy hedge fund investors pay a higher tax. As with Section 1259, this progress
would not materialize if taxpayers responded, instead, by investing in slightly different derivatives
not reached by the rule. The key insight of the case studies is that, unlike with Section 1259, this
response is unlikely because of a discontinuous friction: the ability of dealers to hedge “total
return,” but not a “partial return,” hedge-fund derivative.
Section 1260 is not cost-free, though. It imposes new compliance and administrative
costs. Nor is the measure successful if taxpayers respond with more drastic methods of
avoidance, such as investments in insurance contracts or offshore insurance firms – or, for that
matter, indexed mutual funds or other investments unrelated to hedge funds. These responses
generate new waste (e.g., as taxpayers assume mortality risk they do not want) without raising
revenue, and could also redistribute wealth in questionable ways (e.g., a transfer of fee income
from securities dealers to insurance firms). The net effect of Section 1260 depends on the balance
172

Through a “rollover” rule, for instance, tax would be deferred on any gain that was reinvested. See, e.g.,
Cynthia Blum, Rollover: An Alternative Treatment of Capital Gains, 41 Tax L. Rev. 385 (1986).
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of these competing effects, and further empirical research is needed.
To an extent, though, we know that frictions impede such avoidance. For instance, even
though an indexed mutual fund provides better tax treatment, pretax returns are not comparable.
Put simply, in my experience wealthy people like hedge funds. As discussed above, insurance
contracts and offshore insurance companies represent more viable methods of avoidance.
However, these transactions could be shut down with a surgical Treasury response – without
need for legislation, and the political obstacles associated with it. With these adjustments, a
narrow measure here would be effective. The contrast with Section 1259 is stark, even though
the two share essentially the same statutory standard.

IV. CONCLUSION
The recent record of tax reformers is sobering. Efforts to tax investments have a familiar
pattern. The government learns of a transaction that exploits an inconsistency in the law. Repair
of the inconsistency is off the table for political or administrability reasons. Instead, a narrow
response is lobbed at the particular transaction. This transactional reform can yield symbolic
benefits in the short run. But the system becomes more complex. Even worse, planners may
respond with variations that avoid the rule. Thus, social waste may increase, while revenue from
wealthy taxpayers may not.
These realities raise questions about the whole enterprise of transactional reforms. Yet for
now, more comprehensive responses lack political support. One contribution of commentators is
to build this support. Another, which is the focus of this Article, is to suggest improvements in
transactional responses. The latter effort is critical because, at least in the near term, these
measures will remain important.
When will transactional reforms actually stop the targeted planning, instead of inducing a
new variation? The answer lies in frictions, such as accounting rules, commodities laws, the riskmanagement policies of securities dealers, and the technological limits of dynamic hedging. If a
strong discontinuous friction blocks a transaction, the tax law does not have to block it too. To
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rely on frictions, though, reformers need to know more about them: how much they matter to
taxpayers, whether they can be avoided through restructuring, and the like. This information
usually is not publicly reported, and hard data is seldom available. As a result, reformers need
help in learning about frictions. Legal academics should offer greater assistance. The factual
intricacies of sophisticated commercial transactions are not commonly detailed in law reviews.
More attention to these matters is warranted. Without a grounding in frictions, transactional
reforms are unlikely to play a constructive role.
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Appendix A: Comparing Return from Selling and Hedging
This Appendix compares returns from a taxable sale and various hedges. The appreciated
asset is assumed to be 100,000 shares of publicly-traded stock, each worth $100 (the “hedged
asset”). Current fair market value thus is $10 million, and basis is assumed to be zero.
Hedging transactions are assumed to last for three years. To simplify the comparison, it is
assumed that the hedge is physically settled after three years: that is, the taxpayer delivers the
appreciated property to settle the hedge (and thus is taxed). This assumption is needed to simply
and clarify the comparison with sales, but understates the benefits of hedging. To attain greater
tax deferral, the taxpayer could instead settle the hedge in cash (i.e., so no tax is due on the
hedged asset) and then could enter into a second hedging transaction.
Assumptions are also needed about market prices and rates of return. A risk-free
Treasury bond yields 5% per year, while an equity investment yields 15% per year. The
taxpayer’s borrowing rate is generally 8%, except the discount on a secured prepaid forward is
6.5%. The cost of borrowing stock is .5% of its initial value (and, for simplicity’s sake, this
amount is assumed not to fluctuate with the stock’s value). Protection from risk of loss below
$100 (i.e., a put option with a $100 exercise price) has the same value as opportunity for gain
above $130 (i.e., a call option with a $130 exercise price). To compensate the hedging
counterparty, though, the taxpayer usually exchanges the $100 put for a more valuable call with
an exercise price of $120. In other words, the investment bank’s fee is paid in the form of the
right to any appreciation between $120 and $130, which is generally worth about 3% of the
asset’s value. For individuals, the tax on capital gains is 30% (i.e., 20% federal and 10% state)
and the tax on ordinary income is 50% (i.e., 40% federal and 10% state). For corporations, the
tax on all income is 45% (i.e., 35% federal and 10% state).
I.

HEDGING / SALE FOLLOWED BY FIXED-INCOME INVESTMENT

Part I describes results when taxpayers either sell or hedge and then reinvest in fixedincome assets, such as Treasury bonds. This scenario shows that the retained risk required under
Section 1259 sometimes is a meaningful friction. Unlike a short sale against the box, which can
offer the taxpayer a fixed income yield, a collar or other partial return hedge offers a return like
that of a convertible bond: principal protection and the possibility of profit if the underlying stock
(i.e., the hedged asset) appreciates. As a result, this return is very appealing if the hedged asset
appreciates, but less so if it does not. This effect is explored first for individual taxpayers, and
then for corporations.
A. Individuals
Three scenarios are compared: a taxable sale, with the after-tax value invested in
Treasuries; a short sale against the box with the proceeds invested in Treasuries; and a “collar”
with retained exposure between $100 and $120. The future nominal value of the taxpayer’s
investment after three years is compared.
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1. Taxable Sale
Sale of the position yields $7 million. If this amount is invested in a taxable bond yielding
5% per year, the taxpayer will have $7,538,234 after three years:
Year

Bond Initial Value

Pretax Return

After-tax Return

1
2
3
4

$7,000,000
$7,175,000
$7,354,375
$7,538,234

$350,000
$358,750
$367,718.80

$175,000
$179,375
$183,859

2. Short Sale Against the Box
With a short sale against the box, the taxpayer can reinvest 95% of the sale proceeds in
Treasuries. After three years, she will have the after-tax return earned on these Treasuries minus
fees paid for borrowing stock, plus $7 million (i.e., the $10 million locked in on the hedged asset
minus $3 million in taxes). Thus, after three years she will have $7,653,570.30, which is
$115,335.90 more than if she made a taxable sale:
Year

Initial Value Bond Return Borrow Fee

Pretax Net

1
2
3

$9,500,000
$9,712,500
$9,930,313

$425,000
$435,625
$446,515.60

$475,000
$50,000
$485,625
$50,000
$496,515.60 $50,000

After-tax Return
$212,500
$217,812.50
$223,257.80

Total After-tax Return;
$653,570.30
Total After-tax Value:
$7,653,570.30
Advantage Over Taxable Sale $115,335.90
3. Collar
As the collar entitles the taxpayer to sell the stock for $100 in three years, she will have a
minimum of $10,000,000 pre-tax, or $7,000,000 after-tax. This minimum return is less favorable
than that yielded by the taxable sale (by $538,234) and the short sale against the box (by
$653,570.30). The difference is that, in the latter two scenarios, the taxpayer received the
$7,000,000 million at the outset and reinvested it in a profitable investment (i.e., the Treasuries).
In the collar, in contrast, the taxpayer will have an amount higher than $7,000,000 – and, indeed,
higher than the returns offered in the two other cases – only if the hedged asset appreciates. The
maximum the taxpayer can earn is $12 million pretax, or $8.4 million after-tax, which is
considerably better than the return offered by the fixed-income investments, but also riskier.
(While the taxpayer could borrow against the collar’s value to invest in a Treasury, the transaction
makes no sense because the taxpayer’s borrowing cost will exceed the Treasury yield).
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B. Corporate Taxpayers
1. Taxable Sale
Sale of the position yields $5.5 million. If this amount is invested in a taxable bond
yielding 5% per year, the taxpayer will have $5,966,343 after three years:
Year

Bond Initial Value

Pretax Return

After-tax Return

1
2
3

$5,500,000
$5,651,250
$5,806,659

$275,000
$282,562.50
$290,333

$151,250
$155,409.40
$159,683.10

Final Value:

$5,966,343
2. Short Sale Against the Box

If the taxpayer does a short sale against the box and reinvests 95% of the proceeds in
Treasuries, it will have $6,220,711 after three years, which is $254,369 better than a taxable sale.
The relative advantage of a deferral strategy is greater here because the tax rate on gain for
corporations is higher.

Year

Initial Value Bond Return Borrow Fee

Pretax Net

1
2
3

$9,500,000
$9,733,750
$9,973,928

$425,000
$436,687
$448,696.40

$475,000
$50,000
$486,687
$50,000
$498,696.40 $50,000

Total After-tax Return;
Total After-tax Value:
Advantage Over Taxable Sale

After-tax Return
$233,750
$240,178.1
$246,783

$720,711
$6,220,771
$254,369

3. Collar
The collar assures the taxpayer at least $10 million pre-tax or $5.5 million after-tax, which
is less than in the other scenarios (i.e., $466,343 less than the taxable sale and $720,711 less than
the short sale against the box). Yet the maximum return under the collar, $12 million pre-tax or
$6.6 million after-tax, is more than under the other scenarios (i.e., by $633,657 and $379,289,
respectively).

II.

TAXABLE SALE / HEDGE FOLLOWED BY REINVESTMENT IN
EQUITIES
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Part II describes the results when taxpayers either sell or hedge and then reinvest in
equities. On the assumed facts, taxpayers will find that partial hedges outperform a taxable sale
only if the hedged asset appreciates.
A. Individuals
Three scenarios are compared: a taxable sale, with the after-tax value invested in equities;
a short sale against the box, with 95% of the proceeds reinvested in equities; and a collar-type
prepaid forward in which proceeds are reinvested in equities. The future nominal value of the
taxpayer’s investment after three years is compared.
1. Taxable Sale
Sale of the position yields $7 million. If this amount is invested in equities yielding 15%
per year, the taxpayer will have $9,552,288 after three years (assuming she realizes the gain on
this reinvestment in equities after three years):
Year

Initial Value

Pretax Return

1
2
3

$7,000,000
$8,050,000
$9,257,500

$1,050,000
$1,207,500
$1,388,625

Total Return

$3,646,125

Final Value

After-tax Value

$2,555,288
$9,552,288

2. Short Sale Against the Box
With a short sale against the box, the taxpayer can reinvest 95% of the sale proceeds in
equities. After three years, she will have the after-tax return earned on the equities minus fees
paid for borrowing stock, plus $7 million (i.e., the $10 million locked in on the hedged asset
minus $3 million in taxes). It is assumed that the borrowing fee is financed through deductible
borrowing at 8%. Thus, after three years she will have $10,385,779, which is $833,491 more
than if she made a taxable sale:

Year

Initial Value Pretax Return Borrow
Fee

After-tax BF BF & Interest to Date

1
2.

$9,500,000 $1,425,000
$10,925,000 $1,638,750

$25,000
$25,000

$50,000
$50,000

$25,000
$51,000
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$12,563,750 $1,884,562.50 $50,000
$14,448,313

$25,000

Total Return
Total After-tax Return
Total Fee
Total After-tax Return Net Borrow Fee:
Final Value
Advantage Over Taxable Sale

$4,948,313
$3,463,819
$78,040
$3,385,779
$10,385,779
$833,491

$78,040

3. Collar-Type Prepaid Forward
To avoid a constructive sale, the taxpayer will retain exposure between $100 and $120.
She has locked in $100 of value and, in this scenario, she wishes to reinvest it in equities. Some
formal tinkering will be needed to avoid the margin rules, though, and the cost of doing so is that
interest expense will no longer offset high-taxed ordinary income, but instead will offset lowtaxed capital gain. Specifically, the most straightforward way to hedge and reinvest is to enter
into the collar described above, and then to borrow against its value. Interest would thus be
deductible, subject to the investment interest limitations of Section 163(d) and the straddle
limitations of Section 263(g). Yet under the margin rules, if she uses the loan proceeds to
purchase equities (as, indeed, is her intention), she may not borrow more than 50% of the hedged
asset’s value (i.e., $50).
Taxpayers who wish to reinvest more than 50% restructure the transaction as a prepaid
forward. The hedging counterparty pays an amount up front in return for delivery of stock in the
future. Because this up-front payment is not formally a loan, but a prepayment for a good to be
delivered in the future, the margin rules are commonly considered inapplicable. Thus, more than
50% may be extracted for reinvestment. To avoid a constructive sale, the amount of stock to be
delivered will vary with the stock price. For instance, if the stock price is below $100, the full
100,000 shares are delivered (the equivalent of exercise of a $100 put by the taxpayer). On the
other hand, if the stock price rises above $120, the taxpayer keeps a number of shares worth $2
million – as a way to retain appreciation between $100 and $120. The pretax result, then, is
essentially the same as the collar paired with a loan, except that the margin rules are avoided.
However, consistent with the general theme of this Article – that frictions can undermine tax
planning – the prepaid forward structure imposes an added tax cost. The taxpayer must
compensate the hedging counterparty for advancing money up-front, and this time-value
compensation takes the form of discount. Instead of paying $10,000,000 after three years, the
hedging counterparty pays only, say, $8.2 million up front and makes no further payments.
Although this $1.8 million is akin to interest, it technically does not qualify as such for tax
purposes, and thus does not give rise to a deduction that would offset the 50% tax on ordinary
income.173 Instead, this amount serves to reduce the gain recognized on the hedged asset, as the
173

See Deputy v. Dupont, 308 U.S. 488 (1939) (contract to deliver securities does not qualify as a loan for tax
purposes and so interest is not deductible). See also, generally, Schizer, supra note 7 (discussing trust structure,
which includes variable delivery prepaid-forward).
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amount realized is only $8.2 million instead of $10 million. Thus, this expense serves to offset the
(lower) 30% tax on capital gains. The silver lining for the taxpayer, though, is that investment
interest limitations do not apply. The straddle rules also will not defer this tax benefit as long as
the hedge is physically settled.
Under this structure, reinvestment obviously is less easy than under the short sale against
the box, since a time value charge is imposed, which is much higher than the stock borrow fee in
the latter structure. The discount here is set at 6.5% -- a lower number than the taxpayer’s usual
8% borrowing rate, since the prepaid forward is secured. Given this cost, the taxpayer
outperforms a taxable sale on these assumed facts only if the hedged asset appreciates. Earning
the maximum $2 million pretax on the hedged asset, she will earn $10,213,385, which
outperforms a taxable sale by $661,097.174 Without this added yield, though, her minimum return
of $8,813,385 underperforms a taxable sale by $738,903.
Year

Initial Value Pretax Return

1
2
3

$8,278,491 $1,241,773.7
$9,520,265 $1,428,039.7
$10,948,304 $1,642,245.7
Total Pretax Return
Total Aftertax Return
Tax Due on Hedged Asset = 30% of $8,278,491 =
Minimum Total Position =
Additional After-tax Return if Hedged Asset
Appreciates by $2 million =
Maximum Total Position =

$4,312,059
$3,018,441.
$2,483,547
$8,813,385
$1,400,000
$10,213,385

Comparison with Taxable Sale and Short Sale Against the Box
End Value

Taxable Sale Short Sale Against the Box

Less than $100
Greater than $120

($738,903)
($1,572,394)
$661,097.50 ($172,393.80)

B. Corporate Taxpayers
The above cases are rerun for corporate taxpayers. The key difference is that corporate
taxpayers pay a higher tax on gain, and so deferral strategies are more valuable.
1. Taxable Sale

174

Note that the fee to the investment bank – in effect, the appreciation between $120 and $130 on the stock –
serves the reduce this maximum return by $ 1 million pretax.
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Sale of the position yields $5.5 million. If this amount is invested in equities, the taxpayer
will have $7,075,647 after three years:
Year

Bond Initial Value

Pretax Return

1
2
3

$5,500,000
$6,325,000
$7,273,750

$825,000
$948,750
$1,091,063

Total Pretax Return:
Total After-tax Return
Final Value

$2,864,813
$1,575,647
$7,075,647

2. Short Sale Against the Box
If the taxpayer does a short sale against the box and reinvests 95% of the proceeds in
equities, it will have $8,143,223 after three years, which is $1,067,577 better than a taxable sale.
Year

Initial Value Pretax Return Borrow
Fee

After-tax BF BF & Interest to Date

1
2.
3.

$9,500,000 $1,425,000 $50,000
$10,935,000 $1,638,750 $50,000
$12,563,750 $1,884,562.50 $50,000

$25,000
$25,000
$25,000

Total Return
Total After-tax Return
Total Fee
Total After-tax Return Net Borrow Fee:
Final Value
Advantage Over Taxable Sale

$4,948,313
$2,721,572
$78,348
$2,643,223
$8,143,223
$1,067,577

$25,000
$51,100
$78,348

3. Collar
The corporation is assumed to issue a DECS, a public security that closely resembles a
collar paired with a borrowing. (Unlike an individual, a corporation generally will not face margin
rule issues.) Although funds might be used to invest in equity of a different firm, we might also
assume that these funds finance the corporation’s business opportunities and generate a return of
15% per year. Even so, the assumption here is that this profit is not taxed until the third year after
the DECS is issued. Likewise, the interest is assumed to be deductible without limitation,175 and
175

Thus, it is assumed that the interest would not be capitalized under Section 263(g). For a discussion of this
issue, see Schizer, supra note 7. Recent proposed regulations under Section 263(g) would lead to capitalization
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is funded from other borrowing (i.e., instead of by reducing the amount reinvested). The
underwriter is assumed to collect a 3% fee, such that the taxpayer has only $9.7 million of
proceeds. On these facts, the partial hedge significantly outperforms the taxable sale if the asset
appreciates, but yields a slightly lower amount if the asset does not appreciate.
Year

Initial Value Pretax Return

1
2
3

$9,700,000 $1,455,000
$11,155,000 $1,673,250
$12,828,250 $1,924,238

Total Pre-tax Return:
Total After-tax Return
Total Interest Cost:176
Total Return Net of Costs:
Tax Due on Hedged Asset
Minimum Return (i.e., $5,500,000
Plus Total Return)
Additional Return from
Hedged Asset
Maximum Return

$5,052,488
$2,778,868
$1,378,932
$1,399,936
$4,500,000
$6,899,936
$1,100,000
$7,999,936

Comparison with Taxable Sale and Short Sale Against the Box
End Value

Taxable Sale Short Sale Against the Box

Less than $100
Greater than $120

($175,710)
$924,289

($1,243,287)
($143,287)

in future transactions, though. For a discussion, see Lee Sheppard, A Chill Wind Across the DECS, 2001 TNT
14-6 (Jan. 22, 2001).
176

The annual coupon is assumed to be 8%, or $800,000. Since the amount is assumed to be deductible, the aftertax cost (at a 45% tax rate) is $440,000. Payment of this amount for three years, plus an after-tax borrowing cost
to fund these amounts of 4.4%, yields to a total of $1,378,932.
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Appendix B: Empirical Survey of Public Hedging Transactions: DECS and PHONES

The following table describes 15 matches during 1999 from the following search on Lexis
of the EDGARPlus (EDGARP) file in the COMPANY (COMPNY) library: (maturity w/10 shares
w/10 stock w/10 exchang!) and (contingent w/4 debt w/4 regulation). The rationale for this
search is that, in public hedging transactions such as DECS and PHONES, the public security is
exchangeable for the hedged asset (i.e., the issuer can satisfy its obligation under the security by
tendering the hedged stock). Disclosure for such exchangeable instruments generally mentions
the contingent debt regulations of Treas. Reg. 1.1275-4, as long as the public security is
documented as a debt security. The total dollar value of these transactions – and thus the dollar
amount of the stock being hedged through DECS and PHONES transactions in 1999 – was
$4,834,100,366.177

Issuer
1

Comcast
Corp.
Morgan
Stanley Dean
Witter & Co.
(“MSDW”)
MSDW

2

3

Security
Name
ZONES

Offering
Amount
$1,000,000,000

Filing
Date
10/13/99

Maturity
Date
10/15/2029

Underlying
Sprint stock

Reset PERQS

$17,027,300

10/12/99

10/31/2001

FDX stock

Reset PERQS

$25,000,000

10/7/99

12/15/2001

Oracle stock

4

Salomon
Smith Barney
Holdings Inc.

ELKS

$17,181,900

10/7/99

10/6/2000

Hewlett-Packard
stock

5

Reliant
Energy Inc.

ZENS

$1,000,000,000

9/16/99

9/15/2029

Time Warner stock

Enron Corp.

Exchangeable
Notes

$222,500,000

8/11/99

7/31/2002

Enron Oil & Gas
stock

7

MSDW.

Reset PERQS

$18,000,839

8/6/99

8/15/2001

Qualcomm stock

8

Kerr McGee

DECS

$287,259,450

7/29/99

8/2/2004

Devon stock

6

177

This amount may be slightly overstated because, in some cases, investment banks do not issue these securities to
hedge appreciated positions, but to accommodate a client that wishes to hold a particular type of DECS. Yet this
outcome is more likely for small transactions, which have a relatively modest impact on the overall volume
reported here. Offsetting this effect, moreover, is the likelihood that some hedging transactions were omitted
because the search parameters were underinclusive. For instance, transactions that do not mention the contingent
debt regulations would not register in this search.
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Corp.
9

MSDW.

Reset PERQS

$134,543,750

7/21/99

8/1/2001

Cisco Systems stock

10

Southwest
Securities
Group, Inc.

DARTS

$50,000,000

6/11/99

6/30/2004

Knight/ Trimark
Group stock

11

MSDW.

PERQS

$29,899,212

5/21/99

5/22/2000

Nokia stock

12

MSDW

Reset PERQS

$95,000,025

5/18/99

5/30/2001

Sun Microsystems
stock

13

Tribune Co.

PHONES

$1,099,000,000

4/9/99

5/15/2029

America Online stock

14

Comcast
Corp.
MSDW

PHONES

$718,293,750

3/15/99

5/15/2029

AT&T stock

Reset PERQS

$120,394,140

3/2/99

3/15/01

15

MCI Worldcom stock
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Appendix C: Empirical Survey of Public Hedging Transactions: Trust
Structures
Since individuals, family partnerships and other family vehicles are not suitable registrants
under the securities laws, these taxpayers often form an investment vehicle in order to hedge
through the public markets. The following chart shows the “trust” structures that were filed in
1999, based on the following search on Lexis in the EDGARPlus (EDGARP) file in the
COMPANY (COMPNY) library: (Treasury w/4 securit!) w/10 (forward w/4 contract) w/10
stock w/20 trust. The relevance of Treasury securities is that the trust usually has two assets, a
prepaid forward contract to purchase stock from the taxpayer, and Treasury securities that fund a
periodic payment to public holders. This chart does not include duplicative entries (i.e., when the
same transaction was posted more than once), as well as transactions that were not designed to
hedge appreciated stock. Of the twenty transactions that were filed with the SEC, fifteen were
never finalized. This finding is consistent with the point that transactions costs are relatively high
in these trust transactions. As a result, many taxpayers who consider using the trust structure
ultimately decide to use a private transaction instead. The completed transactions in 1999 have an
aggregate value of $428,967,264.
Issuer

Security
Name
PEPS

Offering
Amount
Never finalized
($200,000,000)

Filing
Date
10/13/99

Maturity Underlying
Date
11/15/02 ScanDisk stock

TARGETS

$32,066,014.05

9/29/99

11/15/02

Amgen, Inc. stock

DECS

$95,625,000

8/9/99

8/15/02

Crown Castle Intl.
Corp. stock

METS

Never finalized

7/20/99

--

Not indicated

1

ScanDisk PEPS
Trust

2
3

TARGETS Trust
IV
DECS Trust V

4

METS Trust

5

Ameritrade
Automatic Common
Exchange Trust

TRACES

Never finalized
($150,000,000)

7/12/99

--

Ameritrade Holding
Corp. Class A stock

6

Eleventh Automatic
Common Exchange
Security Trust

TRACES

Never finalized

7/6/99

--

Not indicated

7

Fourteenth
Automatic Common
Exchange Security
Trust

TRACES

Never finalized

7/6/99

--

Not indicated

8

Thirteenth

TRACES

Never finalized

7/6/99

--

Not indicated
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Automatic Common
Exchange Security
Trust
TRACES

Never finalized

7/6/99

--

TARGETS

65,887,500

6/24/99

8/15/02

Ninth Automatic
Common Exchange
Security Trust

TRACES

Never finalized

5/3/99

--

Not indicated

12

Tenth Automatic
Common Exchange
Security Trust

TRACES

Never finalized

5/3/99

--

Not indicated

13

Seventh Automatic
Common Exchange
Security Trust

TRACES

Never finalized

4/20/99

--

Not indicated

14

TARGETS Trust II

TARGETS

$72,888,750

4/12/99

5/15/01

Lucent stock

15

PIES Trust I

PIES

Never finalized

3/16/99

--

Not indicated

16

PIES Trust II

PIES

Never finalized

3/15/99

--

Not indicated

17

Eighth Automatic
Common Exchange
Security Trust

TRACES

Never finalized

3/3/99

--

Not indicated

18

Trust-Issued
Required Equity
Exchange Security
Trust

T-REX

Never finalized

3/1/99

--

Not indicated

19

DECS Trust IV

DECS

$162,500,000

2/10/99

2/15/02

Maxton Stock

20

Sixth Automatic
Common Exchange
Security Trust

TRACES

Never finalized

1/26/99

--

Not indicated

9

Twelfth Automatic
Common Exchange
Security Trust

10

TARGETS Trust
III

11

Not indicated

MCI WorldCom
stock
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Appendix D: Hedge Fund Swap
This discussion compares a direct investment of $10,000,000 in a hedge fund with
investment in a hedge-fund derivative. The tax rate on short term capital gain and ordinary
income is assumed to be 50% (i.e., 40% federal and 10% state) and the tax rate on long term
capital gain is assumed to be 30% (i.e., 20% federal and 10% state). The hedge fund is assumed
to earn 15% a year. (The assumption is that the hedge fund earns the same 15% available in an
equity investment, but is subject to less risk. As the pretax return on the fund grows, the tax
advantage of a derivative over a direct investment increases.) After this comparison, results are
compared on the assumption that the fund declines in value. (Note that no comparison is run for
corporate transactions, which did not make use of this planning strategy because they are not
eligible for the reduced rate for long-term capital gains.)
Direct Investment: 15% Annual Return
The hedge fund is assumed to distribute 50% of its gains each year to cover the investor’s
tax liability. After three years, a $10,000,000 investment grows to $12,422,969.
Year

Initial Amount 15% Return

Tax

1
2
3

10,000,000
10,750,000
11,556,250

750,000
808,250
866,719

1,500,000
1,612,500
1,733,438

Amount Reinvested
10,750,000
11,556,250
12,422,969

Hedge Fund Swap: 15% Return
Alternatively, assume the taxpayer invested $10,000,000 in Treasuries, which were used
to secure her obligation on a swap. The swap requires the parties to measure the value of a
$10,000,000 investment after three years (the “Value”). For computation of the Value, it is
assumed that any distributions by the fund (e.g., to cover taxes) were immediately reinvested in
the fund. (Note that this reinvestment is the way the swap reflects the benefits of tax deferral –
the investor is allowed to reinvest dollars that otherwise would fund the tax liability). If the Value
is less than $10,000,000 (i.e., if the fund depreciates), the taxpayer must pay the difference. On
the other hand, if the Value exceeds $10,000,000 (i.e., if the fund appreciates, as is assumed
here), the taxpayer receives this excess, and treats it as long term capital gain. Assuming 15%
annual appreciation, the Value is as follows:
Year

Initial Amount Amount Reinvested
After 15% Return

1
2
3

10,000,000
11,500,000
13,225,000

11,500,000
13,225,000
15,208,750

Taxable Gain Tax

Aftertax Value

5,208,750

13,646,125

1,562,625

Schizer, Frictions as a Constraint on Tax Planning

Page 75

In addition, the taxpayer must pay an annual fee equal to $10,000,000 times the Treasury
yield plus 1%. In essence, the taxpayer is paying over the return earned on the Treasury bonds,
plus a 1% annual fee to the investment bank. Swap expenses are generally thought to be ordinary
deductions under Section 212. Accordingly, the taxpayer has a net pretax expense of 1% per
year, which is deductible. (Since swap expenses are generally considered a miscellaneous
itemized deduction, the amounts are subject to the 2% limitation for such deductions under
Section 67 and also are not deductible under the alternative minimum tax. For simplicity’s sake,
these limitations on the deduction are ignored.) Assuming the taxpayer funds these annual net
payments of $50,000 after taxes by borrowing at 8%, the total expense after three years is
$162,320. Hence, the final return, net of expenses, is $13,646,125 – $162,320, or $13,483,805.
Compared with the $12,422,969 earned through a direct investment, the derivative yields an extra
$1,060,836.

What if the Hedge Fund Has Losses? Comparison of Direct Investment and Derivative
As long as the fund appreciates, there is a tax benefit in deferring the gain and converting
it from short-term to long-term capital gain. If the fund declines in value, deferral and conversion
carry a corresponding tax penalty (i.e., a deferred deduction, converted from a short-term to a
long-term capital loss). However, in such cases the parties can settle the swap prematurely (i.e.,
before the end of the taxpayer’s tax year). As a result, losses need not be deferred or converted
to long-term. Thus, while investment in the swap will not carry any tax advantage in this loss
scenario, there generally will be no tax disadvantage. (An exception would be if the fund had
ordinary losses, e.g., from currency trading, that were converted to short term capital losses; yet
most returns from investing are capital gain or loss). A direct investment would have been
preferable only to avoid the fees and transaction costs associated with the derivative.

